Interactive Unawareness Revisited by Halpern, Joseph Y. & Rego, Leandro C.
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
50
90
58
v1
  [
cs
.A
I] 
 19
 Se
p 2
00
5
Interactive Unawareness Revisited∗
Joseph Y. Halpern
Computer Science Department
Cornell University, U.S.A.
e-mail: halpern@cs.cornell.edu
Leandro Chaves Reˆgo
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Cornell University, U.S.A.
e-mail: lcr26@cornell.edu
Abstract
We analyze a model of interactive unawareness introduced by Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (HMS).
We consider two axiomatizations for their model, which capture different notions of validity. These
axiomatizations allow us to compare the HMS approach to both the standard (S5) epistemic logic and
two other approaches to unawareness: that of Fagin and Halpern and that of Modica and Rustichini.
We show that the differences between the HMS approach and the others are mainly due to the notion of
validity used and the fact that the HMS is based on a 3-valued propositional logic.
1 Introduction
Reasoning about knowledge has played a significant role in work in philosophy, economics, and distributed
computing. Most of that work has used standard Kripke structures to model knowledge, where an agent
knows a fact ϕ if ϕ is true in all the worlds that the agent considers possible. While this approach has
proved useful for many applications, it suffers from a serious shortcoming, known as the logical omniscience
problem (first observed and named by Hintikka [1962]): agents know all tautologies and know all the logical
consequences of their knowledge. This seems inappropriate for resource-bounded agents and agents who
are unaware of various concepts (and thus do not know logical tautologies involving those concepts). To
take just one simple example, a novice investor may not be aware of the notion of the price-earnings ratio,
although that may be relevant to the decision of buying a stock.
There has been a great deal of work on the logical omniscience problem (see [Fagin, Halpern, Moses,
and Vardi 1995] for an overview). Of most relevance to this paper are approaches that have focused on
(lack of) awareness. Fagin and Halpern [1988] (FH from now on) were the first to deal with lack of model
omniscience explicitly in terms of awareness. They did so by introducing an explicit awareness operator.
Since then, there has been a stream of papers on the topic in the economics literature (see, for example,
[Modica and Rustichini 1994; Modica and Rustichini 1999; Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini 1998]). In these
papers, awareness is defined in terms of knowledge: an agent is aware of p if he either knows p or knows that
he does not know p. All of them focused on the single-agent case. Recently, Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper
[2003] (HMS from now on) have provided a multi-agent model for unawareness. In this paper, we consider
how the HMS model compares to other work.
A key feature of the HMS approach (also present in the work of Modica and Rustichini [1999]—MR
from now on) is that with each world or state is associated a (propositional) language. Intuitively, this is the
language of concepts defined at that world. Agents may not be aware of all these concepts. The way that is
modeled is that in all the states an agent considers possible at a state s, fewer concepts may be defined than
∗A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Tenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowl-
edge (TARK05).
1
are defined at state s. Because a proposition p may be undefined at a given state s, the underlying logic in
HMS is best viewed as a 3-valued logic: a proposition p may be true, false, or undefined at a given state.
We consider two sound and complete axiomatizations for the HMS model, that differ with respect to the
language used and the notion of validity. One axiomatization captures weak validity: a formula is weakly
valid if it is never false (although it may be undefined). In the single-agent case, this axiomatization is
identical to that given by MR. However, in the MR model, validity is taken with respect to “objective” state,
where all formulas are defined. As shown by Halpern [2001], this axiomatization is also sound and complete
in the single-agent case with respect to a special case of FH’s awareness structures; we extend Halpern’s
result to the multi-agent case. The other axiomatization of the HMS model captures (strong) validity: a
formula is (strongly) valid if it is always true. If we add an axiom saying that there is no third value to this
axiom system, then we just get the standard axiom system for S5. This shows that, when it comes to strong
validity, the only difference between the HMS models and standard epistemic models is the third truth value.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the basic S5 model, the FH model,
the MR model, and the HMS model. In Section 3, we compare the HMS approach and the FH approach,
both semantically and axiomatically, much as Halpern [2001] compares the MR and FH approaches. We
show that weak validity in HMS structures corresponds in a precise sense to validity in awareness structures.
In Section 4, we extend the HMS language by adding a nonstandard implication operator. Doing so allows
us to provide an axiomatization for strong validity. We conclude in Section 5. Further discussion of the
original HMS framework and an axiomatization of strong validity in the purely propositional case can be
found in the appendix.
2 Background
We briefly review the standard epistemic logic and the approaches of FH, MR, and HMS here.
2.1 Standard epistemic logic
The syntax of standard epistemic logic is straightforward. Given a set {1, . . . , n} of agents, formulas are
formed by starting with a set Φ = {p, q, . . .} of primitive propositions as well as a special formula ⊤
(which is always true), and then closing off under conjunction (∧), negation (¬) and the modal operators Ki,
i = 1, . . . , n. Call the resulting language LKn (Φ).1 As usual, we define ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ⇒ ψ as abbreviations
of ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) and ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, respectively.
The standard approach to giving semantics to LKn (Φ) uses Kripke structures. A Kripke structure for
n agents (over Φ) is a tuple M = (Σ, π,K1, . . . ,Kn), where Σ is a set of states, π : Σ × Φ → {0, 1}
is an interpretation, which associates with each primitive propositions its truth value at each state in Σ,
Ki : Σ → 2
Σ is a possibility correspondence for agent i. Intuitively, if t ∈ Ki(s), then agent i considers
state t possible at state s. Ki is reflexive if for all s ∈ Σ, s ∈ Ki(s); it is transitive if for all s, t ∈ Σ, if
t ∈ Ki(s) then Ki(t) ⊆ Ki(s); it is Euclidean if for all s, t ∈ Σ, if t ∈ Ki(s) then Ki(t) ⊇ Ki(s).2 A
Kripke structure is reflexive (resp., reflexive and transitive; partitional) if the possibility correspondences
Ki are reflexive (resp., reflexive and transitive; reflexive, Euclidean, and transitive). Let Mn(Φ) denote
the class of all Kripke structures for n agents over Φ, with no restrictions on the Ki relations. We use
the superscripts r, e, and t to indicate that the Ki relations are restricted to being reflexive, Euclidean,
1In MR, only the single-agent case is considered. We consider the multi-agent here to allow the generalization to HMS. In many
cases, ⊤ is defined in terms of other formulas, e.g., as ¬(p ∧ ¬p). We take it to be primitive here for convenience.
2It is more standard in the philosophy literature to take Ki to be a binary relation. The two approaches are equivalent, since
if K′i is a binary relation, we can define a possibility correspondence Ki by taking t ∈ Ki(s) iff (s, t) ∈ K′i. We can similarly
define a binary relation given a possibility correspondence. Given this equivalence, it is easy to see that the notions of a possibility
correspondence being reflexive, transitive, or Euclidean are equivalent to the corresponding notion for binary relations.
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and transitive, respectively. Thus, for example, Mrtn (Φ) is the class of all reflexive and transitive Kripke
structures for n agents.
We write (M,s) |= ϕ if ϕ is true at state s in the Kripke structure M . The truth relation is defined
inductively as follows:
(M,s) |= p, for p ∈ Φ, if π(s, p) = 1
(M,s) |= ¬ϕ if (M,s) 6|= ϕ
(M,s) |= ϕ ∧ ψ if (M,s) |= ϕ and (M,s) |= ψ
(M,s) |= Kiϕ if (M,s′) |= ϕ for all s′ ∈ Ki(s).
A formula ϕ is said to be valid in Kripke structure M if (M,s) |= ϕ for all s ∈ Σ. A formula ϕ is valid
in a class N of Kripke structures, denoted N |= ϕ, if it is valid for all Kripke structures in N .
An axiom system AX consists of a collection of axioms and inference rules. An axiom is a formula, and
an inference rule has the form “from ϕ1, . . . , ϕk infer ψ,” where ϕ1, . . . , ϕk, ψ are formulas. A formula ϕ
is provable in AX, denoted AX ⊢ ϕ, if there is a sequence of formulas such that the last one is ϕ, and each
one is either an axiom or follows from previous formulas in the sequence by an application of an inference
rule. An axiom system AX is said to be sound for a language L with respect to a class N of structures if
every formula provable in AX is valid with respect to N . The system AX is complete for L with respect to
N if every formula in L that is valid with respect to N is provable in AX.
Consider the following set of well-known axioms and inference rules:
Prop. All substitution instances of valid formulas of propositional logic.
K. (Kiϕ ∧Ki(ϕ⇒ ψ))⇒ Kiψ.
T. Kiϕ⇒ ϕ.
4. Kiϕ⇒ KiKiϕ.
5. ¬Kiϕ⇒ Ki¬Kiϕ.
MP. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ (modus ponens).
Gen. From ϕ infer Kiϕ.
It is well known that the axioms T, 4, and 5 correspond to the requirements that the Ki relations are
reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean, respectively. Let Kn be the axiom system consisting of the axioms
Prop, K and rules MP, and Gen, and let S5n be the system consisting of all the axioms and inference rules
above. The following result is well known (see, for example, [Chellas 1980; Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and
Vardi 1995] for proofs).
Theorem 2.1: Let C be a (possibly empty) subset of {T, 4, 5} and let C be the corresponding subset of
{r, t, e}. Then Kn ∪ C is a sound and complete axiomatization of the language LKn (Φ) with respect to
MCn (Φ).
In particular, this shows that S5n characterizes partitional models, where the possibility correspondences
are reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean.
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2.2 The FH model
The Logic of General Awareness model of Fagin and Halpern [1988] introduces a syntactic notion of aware-
ness. This is reflected in the language by adding a new modal operator Ai for each agent i. The intended
interpretation of Aiϕ is “i is aware of ϕ”. The power of this approach comes from the flexibility of the
notion of awareness. For example, “agent i is aware of ϕ” may be interpreted as “agent i is familiar with all
primitive propositions in ϕ” or as “agent i can compute the truth value of ϕ in time t”.
Having awareness in the language allows us to distinguish two notions of knowledge: implicit knowl-
edge and explicit knowledge. Implicit knowledge, denoted with Ki, is defined as truth in all worlds the
agent considers possible, as usual. Explicit knowledge, denoted with Xi, is defined as the conjunction of
implicit knowledge and awareness. Let LK,X,An (Φ) be the language extending LKn (Φ) by closing off under
the operators Ai and Xi, for i = 1, . . . , n. Let LX,An (Φ) (resp. LXn (Φ)) be the sublanguage of LK,X,An (Φ)
where the formulas do not mention K1, . . . ,Kn (resp., K1, . . . ,Kn and A1, . . . An).
An awareness structure for n agents over Φ is a tuple M = (Σ, π,K1, ...,Kn,A1, ...,An), where
(Σ, π,K1, ...,Kn) is a Kripke structure and Ai is a function associating a set of formulas for each state, for
i = 1, ..., n. Intuitively, Ai(s) is the set of formulas that agent i is aware of at state s. The set of formulas
the agent is aware of can be arbitrary. Depending on the interpretation of awareness one has in mind, certain
restrictions on Ai may apply. There are two restrictions that are of particular interest here:
• Awareness is generated by primitive propositions if, for all agents i, ϕ ∈ Ai(s) iff all the primitive
propositions that appear in ϕ are in Ai(s) ∩ Φ. That is, an agent is aware of ϕ iff she is aware of all
the primitive propositions that appear in ϕ.
• Agents know what they are aware of if, for all agents i, t ∈ Ki(s) implies that Ai(s) = Ai(t).
Following Halpern [2001], we say that awareness structure is propositionally determined if awareness is
generated by primitive propositions and agents know what they are aware of.
The semantics for awareness structures extends the semantics defined for standard Kripke structures by
adding two clauses defining Ai and Xi:
(M,s) |= Aiϕ if ϕ ∈ Ai(s)
(M,s) |= Xiϕ if (M,s) |= Aiϕ and (M,s) |= Kiϕ.
FH provide a complete axiomatization for the logic of awareness; we omit the details here.
2.3 The MR model
We follow Halpern’s [2001] presentation of MR here; it is easily seen to be equivalent to that in [Modica
and Rustichini 1999].
Since MR consider only the single-case, they use the language LK1 (Φ). A generalized standard model
(GSM) over Φ has the form M = (S,Σ, π,K, ρ), where
• S andΣ are disjoint sets of states; moreover, Σ = ∪Ψ⊆ΦSΨ, where the sets SΨ are disjoint. Intuitively,
the states in S describe the objective situation, while the states in Σ describe the agent’s subjective
view of the objective situation, limited to the vocabulary that the agent is aware of.
• π : S × Φ⇒ {0, 1} is an interpretation.
• K : S → 2Σ is a generalized possibility correspondence.
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• ρ is a projection from S to Σ such that (1) if ρ(s) = ρ(t) ∈ SΨ then (a) s and t agree on the truth
values of all primitive propositions in Ψ, that is, π(s, p) = π(t, p) for all p ∈ Ψ and (b) K(s) = K(t)
and (2) if ρ(s) ∈ SΨ, then K(s) ⊆ SΨ. Intuitively, ρ(s) is the agent’s subjective state in objective
state s.
We can extend K to a map (also denoted K for convenience) defined on S ∪ Σ in the following way:
if s′ ∈ Σ and ρ(s) = s′, define K(s′) = K(s). Condition 1(b) on ρ guarantees that this extension is well
defined. A GSM is reflexive (resp., reflexive and transitive; partitional) ifK restricted to Σ is reflexive (resp.,
reflexive and transitive; reflexive, Euclidean and transitive). Similarly, we can extend π to a function (also
denoted π) defined on S ∪ Σ: if s′ ∈ SΨ, p ∈ Ψ and ρ(s) = s′, define π(s′, p) = π(s, p); and if s′ ∈ SΨ
and p /∈ Ψ, define π(s′, p) = 1/2.
With these extensions of K and π, the semantics for formulas in GSMs is identical to that in standard
Kripke structures except for the negation, which is defined as follows:
if s ∈ S, then (M,s) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,s) 6|= ϕ
if s ∈ SΨ, then (M,s) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,s) 6|= ϕ and ϕ ∈ LK1 (Ψ).
Note that for states in the “objective” state space S, the logic is 2-valued; and every formula is either true or
false. On the other hand, for states in the “subjective” state space Σ the logic is 3-valued. A formula may be
neither true nor false. It is easy to check that if s ∈ SΨ, then every formula in LK1 (Ψ) is either true or false at
s, while formulas not in LK1 (Ψ) are neither true nor false. Intuitively, an agent can assign truth values only
to formulas involving concepts he is aware of; at states in SΨ, the agent is aware only of concepts expressed
in the language LK1 (Ψ).
The intuition behind MR’s notion of awareness is that an agent is unaware of ϕ if he does not know ϕ,
does not know he does not know it, and so on. Thus, an agent is aware of ϕ if he either knows ϕ or knows
he does not know ϕ, or knows that he does not know that he does not know ϕ, or . . . . MR show that under
appropriate assumptions, this infinite disjunction is equivalent to the first two disjuncts, so they define Aϕ
to be an abbreviation of Kϕ ∨K¬Kϕ.
Rather than considering validity, MR consider what we call here objective validity: truth in all objective
states (that is, the states in S). Note that all classical (2-valued) propositional tautologies are objectively
valid in the MR setting. MR provide a system U that is a sound and complete axiomatization for objective
validity with respect to partitional GSM structures. The system U consists of the axioms Prop, T, and 4, the
inference rule MP, and the following additional axioms and inference rules:
M. K(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ Kϕ ∧Kψ.
C. Kϕ ∧Kψ ⇒ K(ϕ ∧ ψ).
A. Aϕ⇔ A¬ϕ.
AM. A(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ Aϕ ∧Aψ.
N. K⊤.
REsa. From ϕ⇔ ψ infer Kϕ⇔ Kψ, where ϕ and ψ contain exactly the same primitive propositions.
Theorem 2.2: [Modica and Rustichini 1999] U is a complete and sound axiomatization of objective validity
for the language LK1 (Φ) with respect to partitional GSMs over Φ.
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2.4 The HMS model
HMS define their approach semantically, without giving a logic. We discuss their semantic approach in
the appendix. To facilitate comparison of HMS to the other approaches we have considered, we define an
appropriate logic. (In recent work done independently of ours [Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2005], HMS
also consider a logic based on their approach, whose syntax and semantics is essentially identical to that
described here.)
Given a set Φ of primitive propositions, consider again the language LKn (Φ). An HMS structure for
n agents (over Φ) is a tuple M = (Σ,K1, . . . ,Kn, π, {ρΨ′,Ψ : Ψ ⊆ Ψ′ ⊆ Φ}), where (as in MR), Σ =
∪Ψ⊆ΦSΨ is a set of states, π : Σ×Φ→ {0, 1, 1/2} is an interpretation such that for s ∈ SΨ, π(s, p) 6= 1/2
iff p ∈ Ψ (intuitively, all primitive propositions in Ψ are defined at states of SΨ), and ρΨ′,Ψ maps SΨ′ onto
SΨ. Intuitively, ρΨ′,Ψ(s) is a description of the state s ∈ SΨ′ in the less expressive vocabulary of SΨ.
Moreover, if Ψ1 ⊆ Ψ2 ⊆ Ψ3, then ρΨ3,Ψ2 ◦ ρΨ2,Ψ1 = ρΨ3,Ψ1 . Note that although both MR and HMS
have projection functions, they have slightly different intuitions behind them. For MR, ρ(s) is the subjective
state (i.e., the way the world looks to the agent) when the actual objective state is s. For HMS, there is no
objective state; ρΨ′,Ψ(s) is the description of s in the less expressive vocabulary of SΨ. For B ⊆ SΨ2 , let
ρΨ2,Ψ1(B) = {ρΨ2,Ψ1(s) : s ∈ B}. Finally, the |= relation in HMS structures is defined for formulas in
LKn (Φ) in exactly the same way as it is in subjective states of MR structures. Moreover, like MR, Aiϕ is
defined as an abbreviation of Kiϕ ∨Ki¬Kiϕ.
Note that the definition of |= does not use the functions ρΨ,Ψ′ . These functions are used only to impose
some coherence conditions on HMS structures. To describe these conditions, we need a definition. Given
B ⊆ SΨ, let B↑ = ∪Ψ′⊇Ψρ−1Ψ′,Ψ(B). Thus, we can think of B↑ as the states in which B can be expressed.
1. Confinedness: If s ∈ SΨ then Ki(s) ⊆ SΨ′ for some Ψ′ ⊆ Ψ.
2. Generalized reflexivity: s ∈ Ki(s)↑ for all s ∈ Σ.
3. Stationarity: s′ ∈ Ki(s) implies
(a) Ki(s′) ⊆ Ki(s);
(b) Ki(s′) ⊇ Ki(s).
4. Projections preserve knowledge: IfΨ1 ⊆ Ψ2 ⊆ Ψ3, s ∈ SΨ3 , andKi(s) ⊆ SΨ2 , then ρΨ2,Ψ1(Ki(s)) =
Ki(ρΨ3,Ψ1(s)).
5. Projections preserve ignorance: If s ∈ SΨ′ and Ψ ⊆ Ψ′ then (Ki(s))↑ ⊆ (Ki(ρΨ′,Ψ(s)))↑.3
We remark that HMS combined parts (a) and (b) of stationarity into one statement (saying Ki(s) =
Ki(s
′)). We split the condition in this way to make it easier to capture axiomatically. Roughly speaking,
generalized reflexivity, part (a) of stationarity, and part (b) of stationarity are analogues of the assumptions
in standard epistemic structures that the possibility correspondences are reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean,
respectively. The remaining assumptions can be viewed as coherence conditions. See [Heifetz, Meier, and
Schipper 2003] for further discussion of these conditions.
IfC is a subset of {r, t, e}, letHCn (Φ) denote the class of HMS structures overΦ satisfying confinedness,
projections preserve knowledge, projections preserve ignorance, and the subset of generalized reflexivity,
part (a) of stationarity, and part (b) of stationarity corresponding to C . Thus, for example, Hrtn (Φ) is the
class of HMS structures for n agents over Φ that satisfy confinedness, projections preserve knowledge,
3HMS explicitly assume that Ki(s) 6= ∅ for all s ∈ Σ, but since this follows from generalized reflexivity we do not assume it
explicitly. HMS also mention one other property, which they call projections preserve awareness, but, as HMS observe, it follows
from the assumption that projections preserve knowledge, so we do not consider it here.
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projections preserve ignorance, generalized reflexivity, and part (a) of stationarity. HMS consider only
“partitional” HMS structures, that is, structures in Hrten (Φ). However, we can get more insight into HMS
structures by allowing the greater generality of considering non-partitional structures.
3 A Comparison of the Approaches
As a first step to comparing the MR, HMS, and FH approaches, we recall a result proved by Halpern.
Lemma 3.1: [Halpern 2001, Lemma 2.1] If M is a partitional awareness structures where awareness is
generated by primitive propositions, then
M |= Aiϕ⇔ (Xiϕ ∨ (¬Xiϕ ∧Xi¬Xiϕ)).
Halpern proves this lemma only for the single-agent case, but the proof goes through without change for the
multi-agent case. Note that this equivalence does not hold in general in non-partitional structures.
Thus, if we restrict to partitional awareness structures where awareness is generated by primitive propo-
sitions, we can define awareness just as MR and HMS do.
Halpern [2001, Theorem 4.1] proves an even stronger connection between the semantics of FH and MR,
essentially showing that partitional GSMs are in a sense equivalent to propositionally determined awareness
structures. We prove a generalization of this result here.
If C is a subset of {r, t, e}, letNC,pdn (Φ) and NC,pgn denote the set of propositionally determined aware-
ness structures over Φ and the set of awareness structures over Φ where awareness is propositionally gen-
erated, respectively, whose Ki relations satisfy the conditions in C . Given a formula ϕ ∈ LKn (Φ), let
ϕX ∈ L
X
n (Φ) be the formula that results by replacing all occurrences of Ki in ϕ by Xi. Finally, let Φϕ be
the set of primitive propositions appearing in ϕ.
Theorem 3.2: Let C be a subset of {r, t, e}.
(a) If M = (Σ,K1, . . . ,Kn, π, {ρΨ′,Ψ : Ψ ⊆ Ψ′ ⊆ Φ}) ∈ HCn (Φ), then there exists an awareness
structure M ′ = (Σ,K′1, . . . ,K
′
n, π
′,A1, . . . ,An) ∈ N
C,pg
n (Φ) such that, for all ϕ ∈ LKn (Φ), if
s ∈ SΨ and Φϕ ⊆ Ψ, then (M,s) |= ϕ iff (M ′, s) |= ϕX . Moreover, if C ∩ {t, e} 6= ∅, then we can
take M ′ ∈ NC,pdn .
(b) If M = (Σ,K1, . . . ,Kn, π,A1, . . . ,An) ∈ NC,pdn (Φ), then there exists an HMS structure M ′ =
(Σ′,K′1, . . . , K
′
n, π
′, {ρΨ′,Ψ : Ψ ⊆ Ψ
′ ⊆ Φ}) ∈ HCn (Φ) such that Σ′ = Σ × 2Φ, SΨ = Σ × {Ψ}
for all Ψ ⊆ Φ, and, for all ϕ ∈ LKn (Φ), if Φϕ ⊆ Ψ, then (M,s) |= ϕX iff (M ′, (s,Ψ)) |= ϕ. If
{t, e} ∩ C = ∅, then the result holds even if M ∈ (NC,pgn (Φ)−NC,pdn (Φ)).
It follows immediately from Halpern’s analogue of Theorem 3.2 that ϕ is objectively valid in GSMs iff
ϕX is valid in propositionally determined partitional awareness structures. Thus, objective validity in GSMs
and validity in propositionally determined partitional awareness structures are characterized by the same set
of axioms.
We would like to get a similar result here. However, if we define validity in the usual way—that is, ϕ
is valid iff (M,s) |= ϕ for all states s and all HMS structures M—then it is easy to see that there are no
(non-trivial) valid HMS formulas. Since the HMS logic is three-valued, besides what we will call strong
validity (truth in all states), we can consider another standard notion of validity. A formula is weakly valid
iff it is not false at any state in any HMS structure (that is, it is either true or undefined at every state in every
HMS structure). Put another way, ϕ is weakly valid if, at all states where ϕ is defined, ϕ is true.
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Corollary 3.3: If C ⊆ {r, t, e} then
(a) if C ∩ {t, e} = ∅, then ϕ is weakly valid in HCn (Φ) iff ϕX is valid in NC,pgn (Φ);
(b) if C ∩ {t, e} 6= ∅, then ϕ is weakly valid in HCn (Φ) iff ϕX is valid in NC,pdn (Φ).
Halpern [2001] provides a sound and complete axiomatizations for the language LX,A1 (Φ) with respect
to NC,pd(Φ), where C is either ∅, {r}, {r, t} and {r, e, t}. It is straightforward to extend his techniques to
other subsets of {r, e, t} and to arbitrary numbers of agents. However, these axioms involve combinations
of Xi and Ai; for example, all the systems have an axiom of the form Xϕ∧X(ϕ ⇒ ψ)∧Aψ ⇒ Xψ. There
seems to be no obvious axiomatization for LXn (Φ) that just involves axioms in the language LXn (Φ) except
for the special case of partitional awareness structures, whereAi is definable in terms ofXi (see Lemma 3.1),
although this may simply be due to the fact that there are no interesting axioms for this language.
Let S5Xn be the n-agent version of the axiom system S5X that Halpern proves is sound and complete for
LXn (Φ) with respect toN ret,pdn (Φ) (so that, for example, the axiom Xϕ∧X(ϕ⇒ ψ)∧Aψ ⇒ Xψ becomes
Xiϕ ∧Xi(ϕ ⇒ ψ) ∧ Aiψ ⇒ Xiψ, where now we view Aiϕ as an abbreviation for Xiϕ ∨Xi¬Xiϕ). Let
S5Kn be the result of replacing all occurrences of Xi in formulas in S5Xn by Ki. Similarly, let Un be the
n-agent version of the axiom system U together with the axiom AiKjϕ ⇔ Aiϕ,4 and let UXn be the result
of replacing all instances of Ki in the axioms of Un by Xi. HMS have shown that there is a sense in which a
variant of Un (which is easily seen to be equivalent to Un) is a sound and complete axiomatization for HMS
structures [Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2005]. Although this is not the way they present it, their results
actually show that Un is a sound and complete axiomatization of weak validity with respect to Hretn (Φ).
Thus, the following is immediate from Corollary 3.3.
Corollary 3.4: Un and S5Kn are both sound and complete axiomatization of weak validity for the language
LKn (Φ) with respect to Hretn (Φ); UXn and S5Xn are both sound and complete axiomatizations of validity for
the language LXn (Φ) with respect to N ret,pdn (Φ).
We can provide a direct proof that Un and S5Kn (resp., UXn and S5Xn ) are equivalent, without appealing
to Corollary 3.3. It is easy to check that all the axioms of UXn are valid in N ret,pdn (Φ) and all the inference
rules of UXn preserve validity. From the completeness of S5Xn proved by Halpern, it follows that anything
provable in UXn is provable in S5Xn , and hence that anything provable in Un is provable in S5Kn . Similarly,
it is easy to check that all the axioms of S5Kn are weakly valid in Hretn (Φ), and the inference rules preserve
validity. Thus, from the results of HMS, it follows that everything provable in S5Kn is provable in Un (and
hence that everything provable in S5Xn is provable in UXn ).
These results show a tight connection between the various approaches. U is a sound and complete ax-
iomatization for objective validity in partitional GSMs; Un is a sound and complete axiomatization for weak
validity in partitional HMS structures; and UXn is a sound and complete axiomatization for (the standard no-
tion of) validity in partitional awareness structures where awareness is generated by primitive propositions
and agents know which formulas they are aware of.
4 Strong Validity
We say a formula is (strongly) valid in HMS structures if it is true at every state in every HMS structure.
We can get further insight into HMS structures by considering strong validity. However, since no nontrivial
formulas in LKn (Φ) are valid in HMS structures, we must first extend the language. We do so by adding a
4The single-agent version of this axiom, AKϕ⇔ Aϕ, is provable in U , so does not have to be given separately.
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nonstandard implication operator →֒ to the language.5 Given an HMS structure M , define [[ϕ]]M = {s :
(M,s) |= ϕ}; that is, [[ϕ]]M is the set of states in M where ϕ is true. Roughly speaking, we want to define
→֒ in such a way that if [[ϕ]]M ⊆ [[ψ]]M , then ϕ →֒ ψ is valid inM . The one time when we do not necessarily
want this is if ϕM = ∅. For example, we definitely do not want r ∨ (p ∧ ¬p) →֒ r ∨ (q ∧ ¬q) to be valid
(since r∨ (p∧¬p) will be true at a state where r is true, p is defined, and q is undefined, while r ∧ (q ∧¬q)
is undefined at such a state). Thus, it seems unreasonable to have p ∧ ¬p →֒ q ∧ ¬q be valid, even though
[[p ∧ ¬p]]M = ∅. If [[ϕ]]M = ∅, we take ϕ →֒ ψ to be valid only if ψ is at least as defined as ϕ. Since the set
of states where ψ is defined in M is [[ψ]]M ∪ [[¬ψ]]M , this condition becomes [[¬ϕ]]M ⊆ [[ψ]]M ∪ [[¬ψ]]M .
Let LK,→֒n (Φ) be the language that results by closing off under →֒ in addition to ¬, ∧, and K1, . . . ,Kn;
let L→֒(Φ) be the propositional fragment of the language. We cannot use the MR definition of negation
for LK,→֒n (Φ), since ϕ →֒ ψ may be defined even in states where ϕ and ψ are not defined. (For example,
p →֒ p is true in all states, even in states where p is not defined.) Thus, we must separately define the truth
and falsity of all formulas at all states, which we do as follows. In the definitions, we use (M,s) |=↑ϕ as
an abbreviation of (M,s) 6|= ϕ and (M,s) 6|= ¬ϕ; and (M,s) |=↓ϕ as an abbreviation of (M,s) |= ϕ or
(M,s) |= ¬ϕ (so (M,s) |=↑ϕ iff ϕ is neither true nor false at s, i.e., it is undefined at s).
(M,s) |= ⊤
(M,s) 6|= ¬⊤
(M,s) |= p if π(s, p) = 1
(M,s) |= ¬p if π(s, p) = 0
(M,s) |= ¬¬ϕ if (M,s) |= ϕ
(M,s) |= ϕ ∧ ψ if (M,s) |= ϕ and (M,s) |= ψ
(M,s) |= ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) if either (M,s) |= ¬ϕ ∧ ψ or (M,s) |= ϕ ∧ ¬ψ or (M,s) |= ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ
(M,s) |= (ϕ →֒ ψ) if either (M,s) |= ϕ ∧ ψ or (M,s) |=↑ϕ or (M,s) |= ¬ϕ∧ ↓ψ
(M,s) |= ¬(ϕ →֒ ψ) if (M,s) |= ϕ ∧ ¬ψ
(M,s) |= Kiϕ if (M,s) |=↓ϕ and (M, t) |= ϕ for all t ∈ Ki(s)
(M,s) |= ¬Kiϕ if (M,s) 6|= Kiϕ and (M,s) |=↓ϕ.
It is easy to check that this semantics agrees with the MR semantics for formulas in LKn (Φ). Moreover, the
following lemma follows by an easy induction on the structure of formulas.
Lemma 4.1: If Ψ ⊆ Ψ′, every formula in LK,→֒n (Ψ) is defined at every state in SΨ′ .
It is useful to define the following abbreviations:
• ϕ ⇀↽ ψ is an abbreviation of (ϕ →֒ ψ) ∧ (ψ →֒ ϕ);
• ϕ = 1 is an abbreviation of ¬(ϕ →֒ ¬⊤);
• ϕ = 0 is an abbreviation of ¬(¬ϕ →֒ ¬⊤);
• ϕ = 12 is an abbreviation of (ϕ →֒ ¬⊤) ∧ (¬ϕ →֒ ¬⊤).
Using the formulas ϕ = 0, ϕ = 12 , and ϕ = 1, we can reason directly about the truth value of formulas.
This will be useful in our axiomatization.
5We remark that a nonstandard implication operator was also added to the logic used by Fagin, Halpern, and Vardi [1995] for
exactly the same reason, although the semantics of the operator here is different from there, since the underlying logic is different.
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In our axiomatization of LK,→֒n (Φ) with respect to HMS structures, just as in standard epistemic logic,
we focus on axioms that characterize properties of the Ki relation that correspond to reflexivity, transitivity,
and the Euclidean property.
Consider the following axioms:
Prop′. All substitution instances of formulas valid in L→֒(Φ).
K′. Kiϕ ∧Ki(ϕ →֒ ψ)) →֒ Kiψ.
T′. Kiϕ →֒ ϕ ∨
∨
{p:p∈Φϕ}Ki(p = 1/2).
4′. Kiϕ →֒ KiKiϕ.
5′. ¬Ki¬Kiϕ →֒ (Kiϕ) ∨Ki(ϕ = 1/2).
Conf1. (ϕ = 1/2) →֒ Ki(ϕ = 1/2) if ϕ ∈ LKn (Φ).
Conf2. ¬Ki(ϕ = 1/2) →֒ Ki((ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) = 1).
B1. (Kiϕ) = 1/2 ⇀↽ ϕ = 1/2.
B2. ((ϕ = 0 ∨ ϕ = 1) ∧Ki(ϕ = 1)) →֒ (Kiϕ) = 1.
MP′. From ϕ and ϕ →֒ ψ infer ψ.
A few comments regarding the axioms: Prop′, K′, T′, 4′, 5′, and MP′ are weakenings of the corre-
sponding axioms and inference rule for standard epistemic logic. All of them use →֒ rather than ⇒; in
some cases further weakening is required. We provide an axiomatic characterization of Prop′ in the ap-
pendix. A key property of the axiomatization is that if we just add the axiom ϕ 6= 1/2 (saying that all
formulas are defined), we get a complete axiomatization of classical logic. T (with ⇒ replaced by →֒)
is sound in HMS systems satisfying generalized reflexivity for formulas ϕ in LKn (Φ). But, for example,
Ki(p = 1/2) →֒ p = 1/2 is not valid; p may be defined (i.e., be either true or false) at a state s and
undefined at all states s′ ∈ Ki(s). Note that axiom 5 is equivalent to its contrapositive ¬Ki¬Kiϕ ⇒ Kiϕ.
This is not sound in its full strength; for example, if p is defined at s but undefined at the states in Ki(s),
then (M,s) |= ¬Ki¬Kip ∧ ¬Kip. Axioms Conf1 and Conf2, as the names suggest, capture confinedness.
We can actually break confinedness into two parts. If s ∈ SΨ, the first part says that each state s′ ∈ Ki(s)
is in some set SΨ′ such that Ψ′ ⊆ Ψ. In particular, that means that a formula in LKn (Φ) that is undefined at
s must be undefined at each state in Ki(s). This is just what Conf1 says. Note that Conf1 does not hold for
arbitrary formulas; for example, if p is defined and q is undefined at s, and both are undefined at all states
in Ki(s), then (M,s) |= (p →֒ q) = 1/2 ∧ ¬Ki((p →֒ q) = 1/2). The second part of confinedness says
that all states in Ki(s) are in the same set SΨ′ . This is captured by Conf2, since it says that if ϕ is defined at
some state in Ki(s), then it is defined at all states in Ki(s). B1 and B2 are technical axioms that capture the
semantics of Kiϕ.6
Let AXK,→֒n be the system consisting of Prop′, K′, B1, B2, Conf1, Conf2, MP′, and Gen.
Theorem 4.2: Let C be a (possibly empty) subset of {T′, 4′, 5′} and let C be the corresponding subset of
{r, t, e}. Then AXK,→֒n ∪ C is a sound and complete axiomatization of the language LK,→֒n (Φ) with respect
to HCn (Φ).
6We remark that axiom B2 is slightly modified from the preliminary version of the paper.
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Theorem 4.2 also allows us to relate HMS structures to standard epistemic structures. It is easy to check
that if C is a (possibly empty) subset of {T′, 4′, 5′} and C is the corresponding subset of {r, e, t}, all the
axioms of AXK,→֒n ∪ C are sound with respect to standard epistemic structures MCn (Φ). Moreover, we get
completeness by adding the axiom ϕ 6= 1/2, which says that all formulas are either true or false. Thus, in a
precise sense, HMS differs from standard epistemic logic by allowing a third truth value.
5 Conclusion
We have compared the HMS approach and the FH approach to modeling unawareness. Our results show
that, as long as we restrict to the language LKn (Φ), the approaches are essentially equivalent; we can translate
from one to the other. We are currently investigating extending the logic of awareness by allowing awareness
of unawareness [Halpern and Reˆgo ], so that it would be possible to say, for example, that there exists a fact
that agent 1 is unaware of but agent 1 knows that agent 2 is aware of it. This would be expressed by the
formula ∃p(¬A1p ∧ X1A2p). Such reasoning seems critical to capture what is going on in a number of
games. Moreover, it is not clear whether it can be expressed in the HMS framework.
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A The Original HMS Approach
HMS describe their approach purely semantically, without giving a logic. We review their approach here
(making some inessential changes for ease of exposition). An HMS frame for n agents is a tuple (Σ,K1, . . . ,
Kn, (∆,), {ρβ,α : α, β ∈ ∆, α  β}), where:
• ∆ is an arbitrary lattice, partially ordered by ;
• K1, . . . ,Kn are possibility correspondences, one for each agent;
• Σ is a disjoint union of the form ∪α∈∆Sα;
• if α  β, then ρβ,α : Sβ → Sα is a surjection.
In the logic-based version of HMS given in Section 2.4, ∆ consists of the subsets of Φ, and Ψ  Ψ′ iff
Ψ ⊆ Ψ′. Thus, the original HMS definition can be viewed as a more abstract version of that given in
Section 2.4.
Given B ⊆ Sα, let B↑ = ∪{β: αβ}ρ−1β,α(B). We can think of B↑ as the states in which B can be
expressed. HMS focus on sets of the form B↑, which they take to be events.
HMS assume that their frames satisfy the five conditions mentioned in Section 2.4, restated in their more
abstract setting. The statements of generalized reflexivity and stationarity remain the same. Confinedness,
projections preserve knowledge, and projections preserve ignorance are stated as follows:
• confinedness: if s ∈ Sβ then Ki(s) ⊆ Sα for some α  β;
• projections preserve knowledge: if α  β  γ, s ∈ Sγ , and Ki(s) ⊆ Sβ , then ρβ,α(Ki(s)) =
Ki(ργ,α(s));
• projections preserve ignorance: if s ∈ Sβ and α  β then (Ki(s))↑ ⊆ (Ki(ρβ,α(s)))↑.
HMS start by considering the algebra consisting of all events of the form B↑. In this algebra, they
define an operator ¬ by taking ¬(B↑) = (Sα − B)↑ for ∅ 6= B ⊆ Sα. With this definition, ¬¬B↑ = B↑ if
B /∈ {∅, Sα}. However, it remains to define ¬∅↑. We could just take it to be Σ, but then we have ¬¬S↑α = Σ,
rather than ¬¬S↑α = S↑α. To avoid this problem, in their words, HMS “devise a distinct vacuous event ∅Sα”
for each subspace Sα, extend the algebra with these events, and define ¬S↑α = ∅Sα and ¬∅Sα = S↑α. They
do not make clear exactly what it means to “devise a vacuous event”. We can recast their definitions in the
following way, that allows us to bring in the events ∅Sα more naturally.
In a 2-valued logic, given a formula ϕ and a structure M , the set [[ϕ]]M of states where ϕ is true and the
set [[¬ϕ]]M of states where ϕ is false are complements of each other, so it suffices to associate with ϕ only
one set, say [[ϕ]]M . In a 3-valued logic, the set of states where ϕ is true does not determine the set of states
where ϕ is false. Rather, we must consider three mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets: the set where ϕ is
true, the set where ϕ is false, and the set where ϕ is undefined. As before, one of these is redundant, since it
is the complement of the union of the other two. Note that if ϕ is a formula in the language of HMS, the set
[[ϕ]]M is either ∅ or an event of the form B↑, where B ⊆ Sα. In the latter case, we associate with ϕ the pair
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of sets (B↑, (Sα − B)↑), i.e., ([[ϕ]]M , [[¬ϕ]]M ). In the former case, we must have [[¬ϕ]]M = S↑α for some
α, and we associate with ϕ the pair (∅, S↑α). Thus, we are using the pair (∅, S↑α) instead of devising a new
event ∅Sα to represent [[ϕ]]M in this case.7
HMS use intersection of events to represent conjunction. It is not hard to see that the intersection of
events is itself an event. The obvious way to represent disjunction is as the union of events, but the union
of events is in general not an event. Thus, HMS define a disjunction operator using de Morgan’s law:
E ∨ E′ = ¬(¬E ∩ ¬E′). In our setting, where we use pairs of sets, we can also define operators ∼ and ⊓
(intuitively, for negation and intersection) by taking ∼(E,E′) = (E′, E) and
(E,E′) ⊓ (F,F ′) = (E ∩ F, (E ∩ F ′) ∪ (E′ ∩ F ) ∪ (E′ ∩ F ′)).
Although our definition of ⊓ may not seem so intuitive, as the next result shows, (E,E′) ⊓ (F,F ′) is
essentially equal to (E ∩ F,¬(E ∩ F )). Moreover, our definition has the advantage of not using ¬, so it
applies even if E and F are not events.
Lemma A.1: If (E ∪ E′) = S↑α and (F ∪ F ′) = S↑β , then
(E ∩ F ′) ∪ (E′ ∩ F ) ∪ (E′ ∩ F ′) =
{
¬(E ∩ F ) if (E ∩ F ) 6= ∅,
S↑γ if (E ∩ F ) = ∅ and γ = sup(α, β).8
Proof: Let I be the set (E ∩ F ) ∪ (E ∩ F ′) ∪ (E′ ∩ F ) ∪ (E′ ∩ F ′). We first show that I = S↑γ , where
γ = sup(α, β). By assumption, E = B↑ for some B ⊆ Sα, and F = C↑ for some C ⊆ Sβ . Suppose
that s ∈ I . We claim that s ∈ Sδ, where α  δ and β  δ. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
α 6 δ. Then s /∈ E ∪ E′, so s /∈ I , a contradiction. A similar argument shows that β  δ. Thus γ  δ
and s ∈ S↑γ . For the opposite inclusion, suppose that s ∈ S↑γ . Since α  γ and β  γ, the projections
ργ,α(s) and ργ,β(s) are well defined. Let X = E if ργ,α(s) ∈ B and X = E′ otherwise. Similarly, let
Y = F if ργ,β(s) ∈ C and Y = F ′ otherwise. It is easy to see that s ∈ (X ∩ Y ) ⊆ I . It follows that
(E ∩ F ′) ∪ (E′ ∩ F ) ∪ (E′ ∩ F ′) = S↑γ − (E ∩ F ). The result now follows easily.
Finally, HMS define an operator Ki corresponding to the possibility correspondence Ki. They define
Ki(E) = {s : Ki(s) ⊆ E},
9 and show that Ki(E) is an event if E is. In our setting, we define
Ki((E,E
′)) = ({s : Ki(s) ⊆ E} ∩ (E ∪ E
′), (E ∪ E′)− {s : Ki(s) ⊆ E}).
Essentially, we are defining Ki((E,E′)) as (Ki(E),¬Ki(E)). Intersecting withE∪E′ is unnecessary in the
HMS framework, since their conditions on frames guarantee that Ki(E) ⊆ E ∪ E′. If we think of (E,E′)
as ([[ϕ]]M , [[¬ϕ]]M ), then ϕ is defined on E ∪E′. The definitions above guarantee that Kiϕ is defined on the
same set.
HMS define an awareness operator in the spirit of MR, by taking Ai(E) to be an abbreviation of Ki(E)∨
Ki¬Ki(E). They then prove a number of properties of knowledge and awareness, such as Ki(E) ⊆ KiKi(E)
and Ai(¬E) = Ai(E).
The semantics we have given for our logic matches that of the operators defined by HMS, in the sense
of the following lemma.
7In a more recent version of their paper, HMS identify a nonempty event E with the pair (E,S), where, for E = B↑, S is the
unique set Sα containing B. Then ∅S can be identified with (∅, S). While we also identify events with pairs of sets and ∅S with
(∅, S), our identification is different from that of HMS, and extends more naturally to sets that are not events.
8Note that sup(α, β) is well defined since ∆ is a lattice.
9Actually, this is their definition only if {s : Ki(s) ⊆ E} 6= ∅; otherwise, they take Ki(E) = ∅Sα if E = B↑ for some
B ⊆ Sα. We do not need a special definition if {s : Ki(s) ⊆ E} = ∅ using our approach.
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Lemma A.2: For all formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ LK,→֒n (Φ) and all HMS structures M .
(a) ([[¬ϕ]]M , [[¬¬ϕ]]M ) =∼([[ϕ]]M , [[¬ϕ]]M ))
(b) ([[ϕ ∧ ψ]]M , [[¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)]]M ) = ([[ϕ]]M , [[¬ϕ]]M ) ⊓ ([[ψ]]M , [[¬ψ]]M ).
(c) ([[Kiϕ]]M , [[¬Kiϕ]]M ) = Ki(([[ϕ]]M , [[¬ϕ]]M ))
Proof: Part (a) follows easily from the fact that ∼ ([[ϕ]]M , [[¬ϕ]]M )) = ([[¬ϕ]]M ), [[ϕ]]M ) and [[¬¬ϕ]]M =
[[ϕ]]M .
For part (b), note that
([[ϕ]]M , [[¬ϕ]]M )⊓([[ψ]]M , [[¬ψ]]M ) = ([[ϕ]]M∩[[ψ]]M , ([[ϕ]]M∩[[¬ψ]]M )∪([[¬ϕ]]M∩[[ψ]]M )∪([[¬ϕ]]M∩[[¬ψ]]M )).
Now the result is immediate from the observation that [[ϕ]]M ∩ [[ψ]]M = [[ϕ ∧ ψ]]M and
([[ϕ]]M ∩ [[¬ψ]]M ) ∪ ([[¬ϕ]]M ∩ [[ψ]]M ) ∪ ([[¬ϕ]]M ∩ [[¬ψ]]M ) = [[¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)]]M .
For (c), by definition of Ki,
Ki(([[ϕ]]M , [[¬ϕ]]M )) = ({s : Ki(s) ⊆ [[ϕ]]M}∩([[ϕ]]M∪[[¬ϕ]]M ), ([[ϕ]]M ∪[[¬ϕ]]M )−{s : Ki(s) ⊆ [[ϕ]]M}).
Note that t ∈ ([[ϕ]]M ∪ [[¬ϕ]]M ) iff (M, t) |=↓ϕ, and t ∈ {s : Ki(s) ⊆ [[ϕ]]M} iff for all t′ ∈ Ki(t),
(M, t′) |= ϕ. Thus, t ∈ {s : Ki(s) ⊆ [[ϕ]]M} ∩ ([[ϕ]]M ∪ [[¬ϕ]]M ) iff (M, t) |= Kiϕ, i.e., iff t ∈ [[Kiϕ]]M .
Similarly, t ∈ ([[ϕ]]M ∪ [[¬ϕ]]M ) − {s : Ki(s) ⊆ [[ϕ]]M} iff (M, t) |=↓ϕ and (M, t) 6|= Kiϕ, i.e., iff
(M, t) |= ¬Kiϕ. Hence, t ∈ [[¬Kiϕ]]M .
Note that Lemma A.2 applies even though, once we introduce the →֒ operator, [[ϕ]]M is not in general
an event in the HMS sense. (For example, [[p →֒ q]]M is not in general an event.)
B An Axiomatization of L→֒(Φ)
Note that the formulas ϕ = 0, ϕ = 12 , and ϕ = 1 are 2-valued. More generally, we define a formula ϕ to
be 2-valued if (ϕ = 0) ∨ (ϕ = 1) is valid in all HMS structures. Because they obey the usual axioms of
classical logic, 2-valued formulas play a key role in our axiomatization of L→֒(Φ). We say that a formula is
definitely 2-valued if it is in the smallest set containing ⊤ and all formulas of the form ϕ = k which is closed
under negation, conjunction, nonstandard implication, and Ki, so that if ϕ and ψ are definitely two-valued,
then so are ¬ϕ, ϕ∧ψ, ϕ′ →֒ ψ (for all ϕ′), and Kiϕ. Let D2 denote the set of definitely 2-valued formulas.
The following lemma is easy to prove.
Lemma B.1: If ϕ is definitely 2-valued, then it is 2-valued.
Let AX3 consist of the following collection of axioms and inference rules:
P0. ⊤.
P1. (ϕ ∧ ψ)⇀↽ ¬(ϕ →֒ ¬ψ) if ϕ,ψ ∈ D2.
P2. ϕ →֒ (ψ →֒ ϕ) if ϕ,ψ ∈ D2.
P3. (ϕ →֒ (ψ →֒ ϕ′)) →֒ ((ϕ →֒ ψ) →֒ (ϕ →֒ ϕ′)) if ϕ,ψ, ϕ′ ∈ D2.
P4. (ϕ →֒ ψ) →֒ ((ϕ →֒ ¬ψ) →֒ ¬ϕ) if ϕ,ψ ∈ D2.
P5. (ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1⇀↽ (ϕ = 1) ∧ (ψ = 1).
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P6. (ϕ ∧ ψ) = 0⇀↽ (ϕ = 0 ∧ ¬(ψ = 1/2)) ∨ (¬(ϕ = 1/2) ∧ ψ = 0).
P7. ϕ = 1⇀↽ (¬ϕ) = 0.
P8. ϕ = 0⇀↽ (¬ϕ) = 1.
P9. (ϕ →֒ ψ) = 1⇀↽ ((ϕ = 0 ∧ ¬(ψ = 1/2)) ∨ (ϕ = 1/2) ∨ (ϕ = 1 ∧ ψ = 1)).
P10. (ϕ →֒ ψ) = 0⇀↽ (ϕ = 1 ∧ ψ = 0).
P11. (ϕ = 0 ∨ ϕ = 1/2 ∨ ϕ = 1) ∧ (¬(ϕ = i ∧ ϕ = j)), for i, j ∈ {0, 1/2, 1} and i 6= j.
R1. From ϕ = 1 infer ϕ.
MP′. From ϕ and ϕ →֒ ψ infer ψ.
It is well known that P0-P4 together with MP′ provide a complete axiomatization for classical 2-valued
propositional logic with negation, conjunction, implication, and ⊤.10 Axioms P5-P10 are basically a trans-
lation to formulas of the semantics for conjunction, negation and implication.
Note that all the axioms of AX3 are sound in classical logic (all formulas of the form ϕ = 1/2 are
vacuously false in classical logic). Moreover, it is easy to show that if we add the axiom ¬(ϕ = 1/2) to
AX3, we get a sound and complete axiomatization of classical propositional logic (although many axioms
then become redundant).
Theorem B.2: AX3 is a sound and complete axiomatization of L→֒(Φ).
Proof: The proof that the axiomatization is sound is a straightforward induction on the length of the proof
of any theorem ϕ. We omit the details here. For completeness, we need to show that a valid formula
ϕ ∈ L→֒(Φ) is provable in AX3. We first prove that ϕ = 1 is provable in AX3 using standard techniques,
and then apply R1 to infer ϕ. We proceed as follows.
Given a set G of formulas, let ∧G =
∧
ϕ∈G ϕ. A set G of formulas is AX-consistent, if for all finite
subsets G′ ⊆ G, AX 6⊢ ¬(∧G′). A set G of formulas is maximal AX-consistent if G is AX-consistent and for
all ϕ /∈ G, G ∪ {ϕ} is not AX-consistent.
Lemma B.3: If G is an AX-consistent subset of G′, then G can be extended to a maximal AX-consistent
subset of G′.
Proof: The proof uses standard techniques. Let ψ1, ψ2, . . . be an enumeration of the formulas in G′. Define
F0 = G and Fi = Fi−1 ∪ {ψi} if Fi−1 ∪ {ψi} is AX-consistent and Fi = Fi−1, otherwise. Let F =
∪∞i=0Fi. We claim that F is an maximal AX-consistent subset of G′. Suppose that ψ ∈ G′ and ψ /∈ F . By
construction, we have ψ = ψk for some k. If Fk−1 ∪ {ψk} were AX-consistent, then ψk would be in Fk
and hence ψk would be in F . Since ψk = ψ /∈ F , we have that Fk−1 ∪ {ψ} is not AX-consistent and hence
F ∪ {ψ}, is not AX-consistent.
The next lemma shows that maximal AX3-consistent sets of definitely 2-valued formulas satisfy essen-
tially the same properties as maximal classically consistent sets of formulas.
Lemma B.4: Let AX be any axiom system that includes AX3. For all maximal AX-consistent subsets F of
D2, the following properties hold:
(1) for every formula ϕ ∈ D2, exactly one of ϕ and ¬ϕ is in F;
10We remark that we included formulas of the form Kiϕ among the formulas that are definitely 2-valued. While such formulas
are not relevant in the axiomatization of L→֒(Φ), they do play a role when we consider the axiom Prop′ in AXK,→֒n , which applies
to instances in the language LK,→֒n (Φ) of valid formulas of L→֒(Φ).
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(2) for every formula ϕ ∈ L→֒(Φ), exactly one of ϕ = 0, ϕ = 1/2, and ϕ = 1 is in F;
(3) if ϕ1, . . . , ϕk, ψ ∈ D2, ϕ1, . . . , ϕk ∈ F , and AX3 ⊢ (ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk) →֒ ψ, then ψ ∈ F;
(4) (ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1 ∈ F iff ϕ = 1 ∈ F and ψ = 1 ∈ F;
(5) (ϕ ∧ ψ) = 0 ∈ F iff either ϕ = 0 ∈ F and ψ = 1/2 /∈ F , or ψ = 0 ∈ F and ϕ = 1/2 /∈ F;
(6) ψ = 1 ∈ F iff (¬ψ) = 0 ∈ F;
(7) ψ = 0 ∈ F iff (¬ψ) = 1 ∈ F;
(8) (ϕ →֒ ψ) = 1 ∈ F iff either ϕ = 0 ∈ F and ψ = 1/2 /∈ F; or ϕ = 1/2 ∈ F; or ϕ = 1 ∈ F and
ψ = 1 ∈ F;
(9) (ϕ →֒ ψ) = 0 ∈ F iff ϕ = 1 ∈ F and ψ = 0 ∈ F;
(10) if ϕ ∈ D2 and AX ⊢ ϕ, then ϕ ∈ F;
Proof: First, note that axioms P0-P4 and MP′ guarantee that classical propositional reasoning can be used
for formulas in D2. We thus use classical propositional reasoning with minimal comment.
For (1), we first show that exactly one of F ∪ {ϕ} and F ∪ {¬ϕ} is AX-consistent. Suppose that
F ∪ {ϕ} and F ∪ {¬ϕ} are both AX-consistent. Then ϕ ∈ F and ¬ϕ ∈ F . Since ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) ∈ D2,
AX ⊢ ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ), but this is a contradiction since F is AX-consistent. Now suppose that neither F ∪ {ϕ}
nor F ∪{¬ϕ} is AX-consistent. Then there exist finite subsets H1,H2 ⊆ F such that AX ⊢ ¬(ϕ∧ (∧H1))
and AX ⊢ ¬(¬ϕ∧(∧H2)). LetG = H1∪H2. By classical propositional reasoning, AX ⊢ ¬(ϕ∧(∧G)) and
AX ⊢ ¬(¬ϕ∧(∧G)), so AX ⊢ ¬((ϕ∧(∧G))∨(¬ϕ∧(∧G))) and AX ⊢ ¬((ϕ∧(∧G))∨(¬ϕ∧(∧G))) →֒
¬(∧G). Hence, by MP′, AX ⊢ ¬(∧G). This is a contradiction, since G ⊆ F and F is AX-consistent.
Suppose that F ∪ {ϕ} is AX-consistent (the other case is completely analogous). Since F is a maximal
AX-consistent subset of D2 and ϕ ∈ D2, we have ϕ ∈ F . And since F ∪ {¬ϕ} is not AX-consistent,
¬ϕ /∈ F .
For (2), we first show that exactly one of F ∪ {ϕ = i}, for i = {0, 1/2, 1}, is AX-consistent. Suppose
that F ∪ {ϕ = i} and F ∪ {ϕ = j}, i 6= j, are AX-consistent. Then ϕ = i ∈ F and ϕ = j ∈ F . By axiom
P11, AX ⊢ ¬(ϕ = i ∧ ϕ = j). This is a contradiction, since F is AX-consistent.
Next, suppose that none of F ∪ {ϕ = i} is AX-consistent. Then there exist finite sets Fi ⊆ F such that
AX ⊢ ¬(ϕ = i ∧ (∧Fi)), i = 0, 1/2, 1. Let G = F0 ∪ F1/2 ∪ F1. By classical propositional reasoning,
AX ⊢ ¬(ϕ = i ∧ (∧G)), and AX ⊢ ¬((ϕ = 0 ∧ (∧G)) ∨ (ϕ = 1/2 ∧ (∧G)) ∨ (ϕ = 1 ∧ (∧G))). Now
using axiom P11, we have AX ⊢ ¬(∧G). This is a contradiction, since G ⊆ F and F is AX-consistent.
Let i∗ be the unique i such that F ∪ {ϕ = i∗} is AX-consistent. Since F is a maximal AX-consistent
subset of D2 and ϕ = i∗ ∈ D2, we have that {ϕ = i∗} ∈ F . And since F is AX-consistent, it is clear by
P11, that if j 6= i∗, then {ϕ = j} /∈ F .
For (3), by part (1), if ψ /∈ F , then ¬ψ ∈ F . Thus, {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk,¬ψ} ⊆ F . But since AX3 ⊢
ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk →֒ ψ, by classical propositional reasoning, AX3 ⊢ ¬(ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk ∧ ¬ψ), a contradiction
since F is AX-consistent.
The proof of the remaining properties follows easily from parts (2) and (3). For example, for part (4), if
(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1 ∈ F , then the fact that ϕ = 1 ∈ F and ψ = 1 ∈ F follows from P5 and (3). We leave details
to the reader.
A formula ϕ is said to be satisfiable in a structure M if (M,s) |= ϕ for some world inM ; ϕ is satisfiable
in a class of structures N if it is satisfiable in at least one structure inN . LetMP be the class of all 3-valued
propositional HMS models.
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Lemma B.5: If ϕ = i is AX3-consistent, then ϕ = i is satisfiable in MP , for i ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}.
Proof: We construct a special model M c ∈ MP called the canonical 3-valued model. M c has a state sV
corresponding to every V that is a maximal AX3-consistent subset of D2. We show that
(M c, sV ) |= ϕ = j iff ϕ = j ∈ V , for j ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}.
Note that this claim suffices to prove Lemma B.5 since, by Lemma B.3, if ϕ = i is AX3-consistent, then
it is contained in a maximal AX3-consistent subset of D2. We proceed as follows. Let M c = (Σ, π), where
Σ = {sV : V is a maximal consistent subset of D2} and
π(sV , p) =


1 if p = 1 ∈ V ,
0 if p = 0 ∈ V ,
1/2 if p = 1/2 ∈ V .
Note that by Lemma B.4(2), the interpretation π is well defined.
We now show that the claim holds by induction on the structure of formulas. If ψ is a primitive propo-
sition, this follows from the definition of π(sV , ψ).
Suppose that ψ = ¬ϕ. By Lemma B.4(7), (¬ϕ) = 1 ∈ V iff ϕ = 0 ∈ V . By the induction hypothesis,
ϕ = 0 ∈ V iff (M c, sV ) |= ϕ = 0. By the semantics of the logic, we have (M c, sV ) |= ϕ = 0 iff
(M c, sV ) |= ¬ϕ, and the latter holds iff (M c, sV ) |= (¬ϕ) = 1. Similarly, using Lemma B.4(6), we can
show (¬ϕ) = 0 ∈ V iff (M c, sV ) |= (¬ϕ) = 0. The remaining case ϕ = 1/2 follows from the previous
cases, axiom P11, and the fact that (M c, sV ) |= ψ = i for exactly one i ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}. (For all the following
steps of the induction the case ϕ = 1/2 is omitted since it follows from the other cases for exactly the same
reason.)
Suppose that ψ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2. By Lemma B.4(4), ψ = 1 ∈ V iff ϕ1 = 1 ∈ V and ϕ2 = 1 ∈
V . By the induction hypothesis, ϕj = 1 ∈ V iff (M c, sV ) |= ϕj = 1 for j ∈ 1, 2, which is true iff
(M c, sV ) |= (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = 1. Similarly, using Lemma B.4(5), we can show that (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = 0 ∈ V iff
(M c, sV ) |= (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = 0.
Suppose that ψ = ϕ1 →֒ ϕ2. By Lemma B.4(8), ψ = 1 ∈ V iff either ϕ1 = 0 ∈ V and ϕ2 = 1/2 /∈ V ;
or ϕ1 = 1/2 ∈ V ; or ϕ1 = 1 ∈ V and ϕ2 = 1 ∈ V . By the induction hypothesis, this is true iff either
(M c, sV ) |= ϕ1 = 0 and (M c, sV ) 6|= ϕ2 = 1/2; or (M c, sV ) |= ϕ1 = 1/2; or (M c, sV ) |= ϕ1 = 1
and (M c, sV ) |= ϕ2 = 1. This, in turn, is true iff (M c, sV ) |= ¬ϕ1 and (M c, sV ) |= ¬(ϕ2 = 1/2); or
(M c, sV ) |= (ϕ1 = 1/2); or (M c, sV ) |= ϕ1 and (M c, sV ) |= ϕ2. By the semantics of →֒, this holds iff
(M c, sV ) |= (ϕ →֒ ψ) = 1. Similarly, using Lemma B.4(9), we can show that (ϕ →֒ ψ) = 0 ∈ V iff
(M c, sV ) |= (ϕ →֒ ψ) = 0.
We can finally complete the proof of Theorem B.2. Suppose that ϕ is valid. This implies (ϕ = 0)∨(ϕ =
1/2) is not satisfiable. By Lemma B.5, (ϕ = 0) ∨ (ϕ = 1/2) is not AX3-consistent, so AX3 ⊢ ¬((ϕ =
0) ∨ (ϕ = 1/2)). By axioms P0-P4, P11 and MP′, AX3 ⊢ ϕ = 1. And finally, applying R1, AX3 ⊢ ϕ. So,
the axiomatization is complete.
C Proofs of Theorems
In this section, we provide proofs of the theorems in Sections 3 and 4. We restate the results for the reader’s
convenience.
The next lemma, which is easily proved by induction on the structure of formulas, will be used through-
out. We leave the proof to the reader.
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Lemma C.1: If M ∈ Hn(Φ), Ψ′ ⊆ Ψ ⊆ Φ, s ∈ Ψ, s′ = ρΨ,Ψ′(s), ϕ ∈ LKn (Φ), and (M,s′) |= ϕ, then
(M,s) |= ϕ.
Theorem 3.2: Let C be a subset of {r, t, e}.
(a) If M = (Σ,K1, . . . ,Kn, π, {ρΨ′,Ψ : Ψ ⊆ Ψ′ ⊆ Φ}) ∈ HCn (Φ), then there exists an awareness
structure M ′ = (Σ,K′1, . . . ,K
′
n, π
′,A1, . . . ,An) ∈ N
C,pg
n (Φ) such that, for all ϕ ∈ LKn (Φ), if
s ∈ SΨ and Φϕ ⊆ Ψ, then (M,s) |= ϕ iff (M ′, s) |= ϕX . Moreover, if C ∩ {t, e} 6= ∅, then we can
take M ′ ∈ NC,pdn .
(b) If M = (Σ,K1, . . . ,Kn, π,A1, . . . ,An) ∈ NC,pdn (Φ), then there exists an HMS structure M ′ =
(Σ′,K′1, . . . , K
′
n, π
′, {ρΨ′,Ψ : Ψ ⊆ Ψ
′ ⊆ Φ}) ∈ HCn (Φ) such that Σ′ = Σ × 2Φ, SΨ = Σ × {Ψ}
for all Ψ ⊆ Φ, and, for all ϕ ∈ LKn (Φ), if Φϕ ⊆ Ψ, then (M,s) |= ϕX iff (M ′, (s,Ψ)) |= ϕ. If
{t, e} ∩ C = ∅, then the result holds even if M ∈ (NC,pgn (Φ)−NC,pdn (Φ)).
Proof: For part (a), given M = (Σ,K1, . . . ,Kn, π, {ρΨ′,Ψ : Ψ ⊆ Ψ′ ⊆ Φ}) ∈ HCn (Φ), let M ′ =
(Σ,K′1, . . . ,K
′
n, π
′,A1, . . . ,An) be an awareness structure such that
• π′(s, p) = π(s, p) if π(s, p) 6= 1/2 (the definition of π′ if π(s, p) = 1/2 is irrelevant);
• K′i(s) = Ki(s) if Ki does not satisfy Generalized Reflexivity, and K′i(s) = Ki(s) ∪ {s} otherwise;
• if ∅ 6= Ki(s) ⊆ SΨ or if Ki(s) = ∅ and s ∈ SΨ, then Ai(s) is the smallest set of formulas containing
Ψ that is propositionally generated.
By construction, M ′ ∈ NC,pgn (Φ). It is easy to check that if C ∩{t, e} 6= ∅, then agents know what they are
aware of, so that M ′ ∈ NC,pdn (Φ).
We complete the proof of part (a) by proving, by induction on the structure of ϕ, that if s ∈ SΨ and
Φϕ ⊆ Ψ, then (M,s) |= ϕ iff (M ′, s) |= ϕX . If ϕ is either a primitive proposition, or ϕ = ¬ψ, or
ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, the result is obvious either from the definition of π′ or from the induction hypothesis. We
omit details here.
Suppose that ϕ = Kiψ. If (M,s) |= Kiψ, then for all t ∈ Ki(s), (M, t) |= ψ. By the induction
hypothesis, it follows that for all t ∈ Ki(s), (M ′, t) |= ψ. If Ki satisfies generalized reflexivity, it easily
follows from Lemma C.1 that (M,s) |= ψ so, by the induction hypothesis, (M ′, s) |= ψ. Hence, for
all t ∈ K′i(s), (M ′, t) |= ψ, so (M ′, s) |= Kiψ. To show that (M ′, s) |= Xiψ, it remains to show that
(M ′, s) |= Aiψ, that is, that ψ ∈ Ai(s). First suppose that ∅ 6= Ki(s) ⊆ SΨ. Since (M, t) |= ψ for all
t ∈ Ki(s), it follows that ψ is defined at all states inKi(s). Thus, Φψ ⊆ Ψ, for otherwise a simple induction
shows that ψ would be undefined at states in SΨ. Hence, Φψ ⊆ Ai(s). Since awareness is generated by
primitive propositions, we have ψ ∈ Ai(s), as desired. Now suppose that Ki(s) = ∅ and s ∈ SΨ. By
assumption, Φϕ = Φψ ⊆ Ψ ⊆ Ai(s), so again ψ ∈ Ai(s).
For the converse, if (M ′s) |= Xiψ, then (M ′, s) |= Kiψ and ψ ∈ Ai(s). By the definition of Ai,
Ki(s) ⊆ SΨ, where Φψ ⊆ Ψ. Since (M ′, s) |= Kiψ, (M ′, t) |= ψ for all t ∈ K′i(s). Therefore, by the
induction hypothesis, (M, t) |= ψ for all t ∈ Ki(s), which implies (M,s) |= Kiψ, as desired.
For part (b), given M = (Σ,K1, . . . ,Kn, π,A1, . . . ,An) ∈ NC,pdn (Φ), let M ′ = (Σ′,K′1, . . . , K′n, π′,
{ρΨ′,Ψ : Ψ ⊆ Ψ
′ ⊆ Φ}) be an HMS structure such that
• Σ′ = Σ× 2Φ;
• SΨ = Σ× {Ψ} for Ψ ⊆ Φ;
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• π′((s,Ψ), p) = π(s, p) if p ∈ Ψ and π′((s,Ψ), p) = 1/2 otherwise;
• K′i((s,Ψ)) = {(t,Ψ ∩ Ψi(s)) : t ∈ Ki(s)}, where Ψi(s) = {p : p ∈ Ai(s)} is the set of primitive
propositions that agent i is aware of at state s;
• ρΨ′,Ψ((s,Ψ
′)) = (s,Ψ).
Note that since agents know what they are aware of, if t ∈ Ki(s), then Ψi(t) = Ψi(s).
We first show that M ′ satisfies confinedness and that projections preserve knowledge and ignorance.
Confinedness follows since K′i((s,Ψ)) ⊆ SΨ∩Ψi(s). To prove projections preserve knowledge, suppose
that Ψ1 ⊆ Ψ2 ⊆ Ψ3 and Ki((s,Ψ3)) ⊆ SΨ2 . Then Ψ2 = Ψ3 ∩ Ψi(s) and Ψ1 = Ψ1 ∩ Ψi(s). Thus
ρΨ2,Ψ1(K
′
i((s,Ψ3))) = {(t,Ψ1) : (t,Ψ3 ∩ Ψi(s)) ∈ K
′
i((s,Ψ3))} = {(t,Ψ1) : t ∈ Ki(s)}. Similarly,
K′i(ρΨ3,Ψ1(s,Ψ3)) = {(t,Ψ1 ∩Ψi(s)) : t ∈ Ki(s)}. Therefore, projections preserve knowledge.
To prove that projections preserve ignorance, note that K′i(ρΨ′,Ψ(s,Ψ′)) = K′i((s,Ψ)) = {(t,Ψ ∩
Ψi(s)) : t ∈ Ki(s)} and K′i((s,Ψ′)) = {(t,Ψ′ ∩ Ψi(s)) : t ∈ Ki(s)}. If (s,Ψ′′) ∈ (K′i((s,Ψ′)))↑, then
Ψ′ ∩ Ψi(s) ⊆ Ψ
′′
. Since Ψ ⊆ Ψ′, it follows that Ψ ∩ Ψi(s) ⊆ Ψ′′. Hence (s,Ψ′′) ∈ (K′i(ρΨ′,Ψ(s,Ψ′)))↑.
Therefore, projection preserves ignorance.
We now show by induction on the structure of ϕ that if Φϕ ⊆ Ψ, then (M,s) |= ϕX iff (M ′, (s,Ψ)) |=
ϕ. If ϕ is a primitive proposition, or ϕ = ¬ψ, or ϕ = ϕ1∧ϕ2, the result is obvious either from the definition
of π′ or from the induction hypothesis. We omit details here.
Suppose that ϕ = Kiψ. If (M ′, (s,Ψ)) |= Kiψ, then for all (t,Ψ ∩ Ψi(s)) ∈ K′i((s,Ψ)), (M ′, (t,Ψ ∩
Ψi(s))) |= ψ. By the induction hypothesis and the definition of K′i, it follows that for all t ∈ Ki(s),
(M, t) |= ψ, so (M,s) |= Kiψ. Also note that if (M ′, (t,Ψ∩Ψi(s))) |= ψ, then ψ is defined at all states in
SΨ∩Ψi(s), and therefore at all states in SΨi(s). Hence, Φψ ⊆ Ψi(s) ⊆ Ai(s). Since awareness is generated
by primitive propositions, ψ ∈ Ai(s). Thus, (M,s) |= Aiψ, which implies that (M,s) |= Xiψ, as desired.
For the converse, suppose that (M,s) |= Xiψ and Φϕ ⊆ Ψ. Then (M,s) |= Kiψ and ψ ∈ Ai(s). Since
ψ ∈ Ai(s), Φψ ⊆ Ψi(s). Hence, Φψ ⊆ (Ψ ∩ Ψi(s)). (M,s) |= Kiψ implies that (M, t) |= ψ for all
t ∈ Ki(s). By the induction hypothesis, since Φψ ⊆ Ψ, (M ′, (t,Ψ)) |= ψ for all t ∈ Ki(s). Since Φψ ⊆
(Ψ ∩Ψi(s)), by Lemma C.1, it follows that (M ′, (t,Ψ ∩Ψi(s))) |= ψ for all (t,Ψ ∩Ψi(s)) ∈ K′i((s,Ψ)).
Thus, (M ′, (s,Ψ)) |= Kiψ, as desired.
We now show that M ′ ∈ HCn (Φ). If Ki is reflexive, then (s,Ψ ∩ Ψi(s)) ∈ K′i((s,Ψ)), so (s,Ψ) ∈
(K′i((s,Ψ)))
↑
. Thus, M ′ satisfies generalized reflexivity. Now suppose that Ki is transitive. If (s′,Ψ ∩
Ψi(s)) ∈ K
′
i((s,Ψ)), then s′ ∈ Ki(s) and K′i((s′,Ψ ∩ Ψi(s))) = {(t,Ψ ∩ Ψi(s) ∩ Ψi(s′)) : t ∈ Ki(s′)}.
Since agents know what they are aware of, if s′ ∈ Ki(s), then Ψi(s) = Ψi(s′), so K′i((s′,Ψ ∩ Ψi(s))) =
{(t,Ψ ∩Ψi(s)) : t ∈ Ki(s
′)}. Since Ki is transitive, Ki(s′) ⊆ Ki(s), so K′i((s′,Ψ ∩Ψi(s))) ⊆ K′i((s,Ψ)).
Thus, M ′ satisfies part (a) of stationarity. Finally, suppose that Ki is Euclidean. If (s′,Ψ ∩ Ψi(s)) ∈
K′i((s,Ψ)), then s′ ∈ Ki(s) and K′i((s′,Ψ∩Ψi(s))) = {(t,Ψ∩Ψi(s)∩Ψi(s′)) : t ∈ Ki(s′)}. Since agents
know what they are aware of, if s′ ∈ Ki(s), then Ψi(s) = Ψi(s′), soK′i((s′,Ψ∩Ψi(s))) = {(t,Ψ∩Ψi(s)) :
t ∈ Ki(s
′)}. SinceKi is Euclidean, Ki(s′) ⊇ Ki(s), soK′i((s′,Ψ∩Ψi(s))) ⊇ K′i((s,Ψ)). ThusM ′ satisfies
part (b) of stationarity.
If {t, e} ∩ C = ∅, then it is easy to check that the result holds even if M ∈ (NC,pgn (Φ) − NC,pdn (Φ)),
since the property that agents know what they are aware of was only used to prove part (a) and part (b) of
stationarity in the proof.
Corollary 3.3: If C ⊆ {r, t, e} then
(a) if C ∩ {t, e} = ∅, then ϕ is weakly valid in HCn (Φ) iff ϕX is valid in NC,pgn (Φ).
(b) if C ∩ {t, e} 6= ∅, then ϕ is weakly valid in HCn (Φ) iff ϕX is valid in NC,pdn (Φ).
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Proof: For part (a), suppose that ϕX is valid with respect to the class of awareness structures NC,pgn (Φ)
where awareness is generated by primitive propositions and that ϕ is not weakly valid with respect to the
class of HMS structures HCn (Φ). Then ¬ϕ is true at some state in some HMS structure in HCn (Φ). By
part (a) of Theorem 3.2, ¬ϕX is also true at some state in some awareness structure where awareness is
generated by primitive propositions, a contradiction since ϕX is valid in NC,pgn (Φ).
For the converse, suppose that ϕ is weakly valid in HCn (Φ) and that ϕX is not valid with respect to the
class of awareness structures NC,pgn (Φ). Then ¬ϕX is true at some state in some awareness structure in
NC,pgn (Φ). By part (b) of Theorem 3.2, ¬ϕ is also true at some state in some HMS structure in HCn (Φ), a
contradiction since ϕ is weakly valid in HCn (Φ).
The proof of part (b) is the same except that NC,pgn (Φ) is replaced throughout by NC,pdn (Φ).
Theorem 4.2: Let C be a (possibly empty) subset of {T′, 4′, 5′} and let C be the corresponding subset of
{r, t, e}. Then AXK,→֒n ∪ C is a sound and complete axiomatization of the language LK,→֒n (Φ) with respect
to HCn (Φ).
Proof: Soundness is straightforward, as usual, by induction on the length of the proof (after showing that
all the axioms are sound and that the inference rules preserve strong validity). We leave details to the reader.
To prove completeness, we first define a simplified HMS structure for n agents to be a tuple M =
(Σ,K1, . . . ,Kn, π). That is, a simplified HMS structure is an HMS structure without the projection func-
tions. The definition of |= for simplified HMS structures is the same as that for HMS structures. (Recall
that the projections functions are not needed for defining |=.) Let H−n (Φ) consist of all simplified HMS
structures for n agents over Φ that satisfy confinedness.
Lemma C.2: AXK,→֒n is a sound and complete axiomatization of the language LK,→֒n (Φ) with respect to
H−n (Φ).
Proof: Again, soundness is obvious. For completeness, it clearly suffices to show that every AXK,→֒n -
consistent formula is satisfiable in some structure in H−n . As usual, we do this by constructing a canonical
model M c ∈ H−n and showing that every AXK,→֒n -consistent formula of the form ϕ = i for i ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}
is satisfiable in some state of M c. Since (M c, s) |= ϕ iff (M c, s) |= ϕ = 1, this clearly suffices to prove
the result.
Let M c = (Σc,Kc1, ...,Kcn, πc), where
• ScΨ = {sV : V is a maximal AXK,→֒n -consistent subset D2 and for all p ∈ (Φ − Ψ), p = 1/2 ∈ V ,
and for all p ∈ Ψ, (p = 1/2) /∈ V };
• Σc = ∪Ψ⊆ΦS
c
Ψ;
• Kci (sV ) = {sW : V/Ki ⊆W}, where V/Ki = {ϕ = 1 : Kiϕ = 1 ∈ V };
• πc(sV , p) =


1 if p = 1 ∈ V
0 if p = 0 ∈ V
1/2 if p = 1/2 ∈ V .
Note that, by Lemma B.4(2), the interpretation πc is well defined.
We want to show that
(M c, sV ) |= ψ = j iff ψ = j ∈ V , for j ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}. (1)
We show that (1) holds by induction on the structure of formulas. If ψ is a primitive proposition, this
follows from the definition of πc(sV , ψ). If ψ = ¬ϕ or ψ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 or ψ = ϕ1 →֒ ϕ2, the argument is
similar to that of Lemma B.5, we omit details here.
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If ψ = Kiϕ, then by the definition of V/Ki, if ψ = 1 ∈ V , then ϕ = 1 ∈ V/Ki, which implies that if
sW ∈ K
c
i (sV ), then ϕ = 1 ∈ W . Moreover, by axiom B1, ϕ = 1/2 /∈ V . By the induction hypothesis, this
implies that (M c, sV ) |= ¬(ϕ = 1/2) and that (M c, sW ) |= ϕ for all W such that sW ∈ Kci (sV ). This in
turn implies that (M c, sV ) |= Kiϕ. Thus, (M c, sV ) |= (Kiϕ) = 1, i.e., (M c, sV ) |= ψ = 1.
For the other direction, the argument is essentially identical to analogous arguments for Kripke struc-
tures. Suppose that (M c, sV ) |= (Kiϕ) = 1. It follows that the set (V/Ki) ∪ {¬(ϕ = 1)} is not AXK,→֒n -
consistent. For suppose otherwise. By Lemma B.3, there would be a maximal AXK,→֒n -consistent set W
that contains (V/Ki) ∪ {¬(ϕ = 1)} and, by construction, we would have sW ∈ Kci (sV ). By the induction
hypothesis, (M c, sW ) 6|= (ϕ = 1), and so (M c, sW ) 6|= ϕ. Thus, (M c, sV ) 6|= Kiϕ, contradicting our
assumption. Since (V/Ki) ∪ {¬(ϕ = 1)} is not AXK,→֒n -consistent, there must be some finite subset, say
{ϕ1, ..., ϕk ,¬(ϕ = 1)}, which is not AXK,→֒n -consistent. By classical propositional reasoning (which can
be applied since all formulas are in D2),
AXK,→֒n ⊢ ϕ1 →֒ (ϕ2 →֒ (... →֒ (ϕk →֒ (ϕ = 1)))).
By Gen,
AXK,→֒n ⊢ Ki(ϕ1 →֒ (ϕ2 →֒ (... →֒ (ϕk →֒ (ϕ = 1))))). (2)
Using axiom K′ and classical propositional reasoning, we can show by induction on k that
AXK,→֒n ⊢ Ki(ϕ1 →֒ (ϕ2 →֒ (... →֒ (ϕk →֒ (ϕ = 1))))) →֒ (3)
→֒ (Kiϕ1 →֒ (Kiϕ2 →֒ (... →֒ (Kiϕk →֒ (Ki(ϕ = 1)))))).
Now by MP′ and Equations (2) and (3), we get
AXK,→֒n ⊢ (Kiϕ1 →֒ (Kiϕ2 →֒ (... →֒ (Kiϕk →֒ (Ki(ϕ = 1)))))).
By Lemma B.4(10), it follows that
Kiϕ1 →֒ (Kiϕ2 →֒ (... →֒ (Kiϕk →֒ (Ki(ϕ = 1))))) ∈ V.
Since ϕ1, ..., ϕk ∈ V/Ki, there exist formulas α1, . . . , αk such that ϕi has the form αi = 1, for i = 1, . . . , k.
By definition of V/Ki, (Kiα1) = 1, ..., (Kiαk) = 1 ∈ V . Note that, by Prop′, AXK,→֒n ⊢ αj →֒ (αj = 1).
So, by Gen, K′, Prop′, and MP′, AXK,→֒n ⊢ Kiαj →֒ Ki(αj = 1). Thus, Kiαj →֒ Ki(αj = 1) ∈ V .
Another application of Prop′ gives that AXK,→֒n ⊢ ((Kiαj) = 1 ∧ (Kiαj →֒ Ki(αj = 1)) →֒ Ki(αj = 1).
Since (Kiαj) = 1 ∧ (Kiαj →֒ Ki(αj = 1) ∈ V , it follows that Ki(αj = 1) ∈ V ; i.e., Kiϕj ∈ V . Note
that, by Prop′, AXK,→֒n ⊢ (β∧ (β →֒ γ)) →֒ γ. By repeatedly applying this observation and Lemma B.4(3),
we get that Ki(ϕ = 1) ∈ V . Since, (M c, sV ) |= (Kiϕ) = 1 implies (M c, sV ) 6|= ϕ = 1/2, it follows by
the induction hypothesis that ϕ = 1/2 /∈ V . Therefore (ϕ = 0 ∨ ϕ = 1) ∈ V , so by axiom B2 and Lemma
B.4(3), (Kiϕ) = 1 ∈ V , as desired.11
Finally, by axiom B1 and Lemma B.4(3), (Kiϕ) = 1/2 ∈ V iff ϕ = 1/2 ∈ V . By the induction
hypothesis, ϕ = 1/2 ∈ V iff (M c, sV ) |= ϕ = 1/2. By the definition of |=, (M c, sV ) |= ϕ = 1/2 iff
(M c, sV ) |= Kiϕ = 1/2.
This completes the proof of (1). Since every AXK,→֒n -consistent formula ϕ is in some maximal AXK,→֒n -
consistent set, ϕ must be satisfied at some state in M c.
It remains to show that M c satisfies confinedness. So suppose that sV ∈ SΨ. We must show that
Kci (sV ) ⊆ SΨ′ for some Ψ′ ⊆ Ψ. This is equivalent to showing that, for all sW , sW ′ ∈ Kci (sV ) and all
11This proof is almost identical to the standard modal logic proof that (M, sV ) |= Kiϕ implies Kiϕ ∈ V [Fagin, Halpern,
Moses, and Vardi 1995].
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primitive propositions p, (a) (M c, sW ) |= p = 1/2 iff (M c, sW ′) |= p = 1/2 and (b) if (M c, sV ) |= p =
1/2, then (M c, sW ) |= p = 1/2. For (a), suppose that sW , sW ′ ∈ Ki(s) and (M c, sW ) |= p = 1/2. Since
sW ∈ K
c
i (sV ), we must have (M c, sV ) |= ¬Ki((p ∨ ¬p) = 1). V contains every instance of Conf2. Thus,
by (1), (M c, sV ) |= ¬Ki(p = 1/2) →֒ Ki((p ∨ ¬p) = 1). It follows that (M c, sV ) |= Ki(p = 1/2). Thus,
(M c, sW ′) |= p = 1/2, as desired. For (b), suppose that (M c, sV ) |= p = 1/2. Since V contains every
instance of Conf1, it follows from (1) that (M c, sV ) |= p = 1/2 →֒ Ki(p = 1/2). It easily follows that
(M c, sW ) |= p = 1/2. Thus, M c ∈ H−n , as desired.
To finish the proof that AXK,→֒n is complete with respect to H−n (Φ), suppose that ϕ is valid in H−n (Φ).
This implies that (ϕ = 0) ∨ (ϕ = 1/2) is not satisfiable, so by (1), (ϕ = 0) ∨ (ϕ = 1/2) is not AXK,→֒n -
consistent. Thus, AXK,→֒n ⊢ ¬((ϕ = 0) ∨ (ϕ = 1/2)). By Prop′ and MP′, it follows that AXK,→֒n ⊢ ϕ = 1
and AXK,→֒n ⊢ ϕ, as desired.
We now want to show that there exist projection functions ρcΨ′,Ψ such that (Σc,Kc1, . . . ,Kcn, πc, {ρcΨ′,Ψ :
Ψ ⊆ Ψ′ ⊆ Φ}) ∈ Hn(Φ). The intention is to define ρcΨ′,Ψ so that ρcΨ′,Ψ(sV ) = sW , where sW ∈ ScΨ and
agrees with sV on all formulas in LK,→֒n (Ψ). (We say that sV agrees with sW on ϕ if (M c, sV ) |= ϕ iff
(M c, sW ) |= ϕ.) But first we must show that this is well-defined; that is, that there exists a unique W with
these properties. To this end, let RΨ′,Ψ be a binary relation on states in Σc such that RΨ′,Ψ(sV , sW ) holds if
sV ∈ S
c
Ψ′ , sW ∈ S
c
Ψ, and sV and sW agree on formulas in LK,→֒n (Ψ). We want to show that RΨ′,Ψ actually
defines a function; that is, for each state sV ∈ ScΨ′ , there exists a unique sW ∈ ScΨ such that RΨ′,Ψ(sV , sW ).
The following lemma proves existence.
Lemma C.3: If Ψ ⊆ Ψ′, then for all sV ∈ ScΨ′ , there exists sW ∈ ScΨ such that RΨ′,Ψ(sV , sW ) holds.
Proof: Suppose that sV ∈ ScΨ′ . Let VΨ be the subset of V containing all formulas of the form ϕ = 1,
where ϕ contains only primitive propositions in Ψ. It is easily seen that VΨ ∪ {p = 1/2 : p /∈ Ψ} is
AXK,→֒n -consistent. For suppose, by way of contradiction, that it is not AXK,→֒n -consistent. So, without
loss of generality, there exists a formula ψ such that ψ = 1 ∈ VΨ and AXK,→֒n ⊢ p1 = 1/2 →֒ (p2 =
1/2 →֒ (. . . →֒ (pk = 1/2 →֒ ¬(ψ = 1)))), where pi 6= pj for i 6= j and p1, . . . , pk ∈ (Φ − Ψ). By
Lemma C.2, it follows that H−n |= p1 = 1/2 →֒ (p2 = 1/2 →֒ (. . . →֒ (pk = 1/2 →֒ ¬(ψ = 1)))). It
easily follows that H−n |= ¬(ψ = 1). Applying Lemma C.2 again, we get that AXK,→֒n ⊢ ¬(ψ = 1). This
is a contradiction, since ψ = 1 ∈ V and V is a maximal AXK,→֒n -consistent subset of D2. It follows that
VΨ ∪ {p = 1/2 : p /∈ Ψ} is contained in some maximal AXK,→֒n -consistent subset W of D2. So sV and
sW agrees on all formulas of the form ϕ = 1 for ϕ ∈ LK,→֒n (Ψ) and therefore agree on all formulas in
LK,→֒n (Ψ), i.e., RΨ′,Ψ(sV , sW ) holds.
The next lemma proves uniqueness.
Lemma C.4: If Ψ ⊆ Ψ′, then for all sV ∈ ScΨ′ , sW , sW ′ ∈ ScΨ, if RΨ′,Ψ(sV , sW ) and RΨ′,Ψ(sV , sW ′) both
hold, then W =W ′.
Proof: Suppose that RΨ′,Ψ(sV , sW ) and RΨ′,Ψ(sV , sW ′) both hold. We want to show that W =W ′.
Define a formula ψ to be simple if it is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form ϕ = k, where ϕ is
implication-free. It is easy to check that if ϕ is implication-free, since sW ∈ SΨ, then (M c, sW ) |= ϕ = 1/2
iff Φϕ − Ψ 6= ∅; the same is true for sW ′ . Moreover, if Φϕ ⊆ Ψ, then sW and sW ′ agree on ϕ. Thus, it
easily follows that sW and sW ′ agree on all simple formulas. We show that W =W ′ by showing that every
formula is equivalent to a simple formula; that is, for every formula ϕ ∈ D2, there exists a simple formula
ϕ′ such that H−n |= ϕ ⇀↽ ϕ′.
First, we prove this for formulas ϕ of the form ψ = k, by induction on the structure of ψ. If ψ is a
primitive proposition p, then ϕ is simple. The argument is straightforward, using the semantic definitions,
if ψ is of the form ¬ψ′, ψ1 ∧ ψ2, or ψ1 →֒ ψ2.
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If ψ has the form Kiψ′, we proceed by cases. If k = 1/2, then the result follows immediately from
the induction hypothesis, using the observation that H−n |= Kiψ′ = 1/2 ⇀↽ ψ′ = 1/2. To deal with the
case k = 1, for Φ′ ⊆ Φψ, define σψ,Φ′ =
∧
p∈Φ′((p ∨ ¬p) = 1) ∧
∧
p∈(Φψ−Φ′)
p = 1/2. By the induction
hypothesis, ψ′ = 1 is equivalent to a simple formula ψ′′. Moreover, ψ′′ is equivalent to
∨
Φ′⊆Φψ
(ψ′′∧σψ,Φ′).
Finally, note that ψ′′ ∧ σψ,Φ′ is equivalent to a formula where each subformula ξ = k of ψ′′ such that
Φξ − Φ
′ 6= ∅ is replaced by ⊤ if k = 1/2 and replaced by ⊥ if k 6= 1/2; each subformula of the form
ξ = 1/2 such that Φξ ⊆ Φ′ is replaced by ⊥. Thus, ψ′′ ∧ σψ,Φ′ is equivalent to a formula of the form
ψΦ′ ∧ σψ,Φ′ , where ψΦ′ is simple, all of its primitive propositions are in Φ′, and all of its subformulas have
the form ξ = 0 or ξ = 1. Let σ+ψ,Φ′ =
∧
p∈Φ′((p ∨ ¬p) = 1) and let σ−ψ,Φ′ =
∧
p∈(Φψ−Φ′)
(p = 1/2) (so that
σψ,Φ′ = σ
+
ψ,Φ′ ∧σ
−
ψ,Φ′). An easy induction on the structure of a formula shows that ψΦ′ ∧σ+ψ,Φ′ is equivalent
to ξ′ = 1 ∧ σ+ψ,Φ′ , where ξ′ is an implication-free formula. Finally, it is easy to see that ξ′ = 1 ∧ σ
+
ψ,Φ′ is
equivalent to a formula ξ′′Φ′ = 1, where ξ′′Φ′ is implication-free. To summarize, we have
H−n |= ψ
′ = 1⇀↽
∨
Φ′⊆Φψ
(ξ′′Φ′ = 1 ∧ σ
−
ψ,Φ′).
It easily follows that we have
H−n |= Ki(ψ
′ = 1)⇀↽Ki

 ∨
Φ′⊆Φ
(ξ′′Φ′ = 1 ∧ σ
−
ψ,Φ′)

 . (4)
It follows from confinedness that
H−n |= Ki

 ∨
Φ′⊆Φ
(ξ′′Φ′ = 1 ∧ σ
−
ψ,Φ′)

⇀↽ ∨
Φ′⊆Φ
Ki(ξ
′′
Φ′ = 1 ∧ σ
−
ψ,Φ′). (5)
Since H−n |= Ki(ψ1 ∧ ψ2)⇀↽ Kiψ1 ∧Kiψ2 and H−n |= ξ = 1/2⇀↽Ki(ξ = 1/2), it follows that
H−n |= Ki(ξ
′′
Φ′ = 1 ∧ σ
−
ψ,Φ′)⇀↽Ki(ξ
′′
Φ′ = 1) ∧ σ
−
ψ,Φ′ . (6)
Finally, since H−n |= Ki(ξ = 1)⇀↽Kiξ = 1, we can conclude from (4), (5), and (6) that
H−n |= (Kiψ
′) = 1⇀↽ (Kiξ
′′
Φ′) = 1 ∧ σ
−
ψ,Φ′ ,
and hence Kiψ′ = 1 is equivalent to a simple formula.
Since Kiψ = 0 is equivalent to ¬(Kiψ = 1) ∧ ¬(Kiψ = 1/2), and each of Kiψ = 1 and Kiψ = 1/2
is equivalent to a simple formula, it follows that Kiψ = 0 is equivalent to a simple formula.
The arguments that ¬ψ1, ψ1 ∧ ψ2, ψ1 →֒ ψ2, and Kiψ1 are equivalent to simple formulas if ψ1 and
ψ2 are follows similar lines, and is left to the reader. It follows that every formula in D2 is equivalent to a
simple formula. This shows that W =W ′, as desired.
It follows from Lemmas C.3 and C.4 that RΨ,Ψ′ defines a function. We take this to be the definition of
ρcΨ,Ψ′ . We now must show that the projection functions are coherent.
Lemma C.5: If Ψ1 ⊆ Ψ2 ⊆ Ψ3, then ρcΨ3,Ψ1 = ρcΨ3,Ψ2 ◦ ρcΨ2,Ψ1 .
Proof: If sV ∈ SΨ3 , we must show that ρcΨ3,Ψ1(sV ) = ρ
c
Ψ2,Ψ1
(ρcΨ3,Ψ2(sV )). Let sW = ρ
c
Ψ3,Ψ2
(sV ) and
sX = ρ
c
Ψ2,Ψ1
(sW ). Then sW and sV agree on all formulas in LK,→֒n (Ψ2) and sW and sX agree on all
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formulas in LK,→֒n (Ψ1). Thus, sV and sX agree on all formulas in LK,→֒n (Ψ1). Moreover, by construction,
sX ∈ SΨ1 . By Lemma C.4, we must have sX = ρcΨ3,Ψ1(sV ).
Since we have now shown that the projection functions are well defined, from here on, we abuse notation
and refer to M c as (Σc,Kc1, . . . ,Kcn, πc, {ρcΨ′,Ψ : Ψ ⊆ Ψ′ ⊆ Φ}). To complete the proof of Theorem 4.2,
we now show that M c satisfies projection preserves knowledge and ignorance. Both facts will follow easily
from Proposition C.7 below.
We first need a lemma, which provides a condition for sW to be in Kci (SV ) that is easier to check.
Lemma C.6: If Kci (sV ) ⊆ ScΨ, sW ∈ ScΨ, and V/Ki ∩ LK,→֒n (Ψ) ⊆W , then sW ∈ Kci (sV ).
Proof: Suppose that V and W are as in the antecedent of the statement of the lemma. We must show that
V/Ki ⊆W .
First note that V/Ki is closed under implication. That is, if ϕ1 = 1 ∈ V/Ki, and AXK,→֒n ⊢ ϕ1 →֒ ϕ2,
then ϕ2 = 1 ∈ V/Ki. This follows from the observations that if AXK,→֒n ⊢ ϕ1 →֒ ϕ2, then AXK,→֒n ⊢
Ki(ϕ1 →֒ ϕ2), and AXK,→֒n ⊢ Kiϕ1 →֒ Kiϕ2; so, by Prop′, AXK,→֒n ⊢ (Kiϕ1 →֒ Kiϕ2) = 1. Thus,
(Kiϕ1 →֒ Kiϕ2) = 1 ∈ V . Moreover, since ϕ1 = 1 ∈ V/Ki, we must have Kiϕ1 = 1 ∈ V . Finally, by
Prop′, AXK,→֒n ⊢ (Kiϕ1 = 1∧(Kiϕ1 →֒ Kiϕ2) = 1) →֒ Kiϕ2 = 1. Thus, Lemma B.4(3), Kiϕ2 = 1 ∈ V .
So ϕ2 = 1 ∈W/Ki, as desired. By Lemma B.4(3), W is also closed under implication. Thus, by the proof
of Lemma C.4, it suffices to show that ϕ = 1 ∈ W for each simple formula ϕ such that Kiϕ = 1 ∈ V .
Indeed, we can take ϕ to be in conjunctive normal form: a conjunction of disjunctions of formulas of basic
formulas, that is formulas of the form ψ = k where ψ is implication-free. Moreover, since by Lemma B.4(4),
W is closed under conjunction (ϕ1 ∈ W and ϕ2 ∈ W implies that ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ W ) and it is easy to show
that V/Ki is closed under breaking up of conjunctions (if ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ V/Ki then ϕi ∈ V/Ki for i = 1, 2),
it suffices to show that ψ = 1 ∈ W for each disjunction ψ of basic formulas such that Kiψ = 1 ∈ V . We
proceed by induction on the number of disjuncts in ψ.
If there is only one disjunct in ψ, that is, ψ has the form ψ′ = k, where ψ′ is implication-free, suppose
first that k = 1/2. It is easy to check that H−n |= (ψ′ = 1/2) ⇀↽
∨
p∈Φψ′
(p = 1/2) and H−n |= Ki(ψ′ =
1/2) ⇀↽
∨
p∈Φψ′
Ki(p = 1/2). Since (Ki(ψ′ = 1/2)) = 1 ∈ V , by Prop′ and Lemma B.4(3) Ki(ψ′ =
1/2) ∈ V and Ki(p = 1/2) ∈ V for some p ∈ Φψ′ (since, by Lemma C.2, for all formulas σ, we have
σ ∈ V iff (M c, sV ) |= σ). Since Kci (sV ) ⊆ ScΨ, it must be the case that Ki(p = 1/2) ∈ V iff p /∈ Ψ. Since
sW ∈ S
c
Ψ, p = 1/2 ∈ W . Since W is closed under implication, ψ′ = 1/2 ∈ W , as desired. If k = 0 or
k = 1, then it is easy to see that ψ = 1 ∈ V/Ki only if ψ = 1 ∈ LK,→֒n (Ψ) so, by assumption, ψ = 1 ∈W .
If ψ has more than one disjunct, suppose that there is some disjunct of the form ψ′ = 1/2 in ψ. If
there is some p ∈ (Φψ′ − Ψ) then, as above, we have Ki(p = 1/2) ∈ V and p = 1/2 ∈ W , and, thus,
ψ′ = 1/2 ∈ W . Therefore, ψ = 1 ∈ W . If there is no primitive proposition p ∈ (Φψ′ − Ψ), then
(M c, sV ) |= Ki(ψ
′ 6= 1/2) = 1, and thus (ψ′ 6= 1/2) = 1 ∈ V/Ki. It follows that if ψ′′ is the formula
that results from removing the disjunct ψ′ = 1/2 from ψ, then ψ′′ ∈ V/Ki. The result now follows from
the induction hypothesis. Thus, we can assume without loss of generality that every disjunct of ψ has the
form ψ′ = 0 or ψ′ = 1. If there is some disjunct ψ′ = k, k ∈ {0, 1}, that mentions a primitive proposition
p such that p /∈ Ψ, then it is easy to check that Ki(ψ′ = 1/2) ∈ V . Thus, (ψ′ = 1/2) = 1 ∈ V/Ki. Again,
it follows that if ψ′′ is the formula that results from removing the disjunct ψ′ = k from ψ, then ψ′′ ∈ V/Ki
and, again, the result follows from the induction hypothesis. Thus, we can assume that ψ ∈ LK,→֒n (Ψ). But
then ψ ∈ V/Ki, by assumption.
Proposition C.7: Suppose Ψ1 ⊆ Ψ2, sV ∈ ScΨ2 , sW = ρ
c
Ψ2,Ψ1
(sV ), K
c
i (sV ) ⊆ S
c
Ψ3
, and Kci (sW ) ⊆ ScΨ4 .
Then Ψ4 = Ψ1 ∩Ψ3 and ρcΨ3,Ψ4(K
c
i (sV )) = K
c
i (sW ).
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Proof: By the definition of projection, Ψ4 ⊆ Ψ1. To show that Ψ4 ⊆ Ψ3, suppose that p ∈ Ψ4. Since
Kci (sW ) ⊆ S
c
Ψ4
, (M c, sW ) |= Ki(p ∨ ¬p). Since Ψ4 ⊆ Ψ1, by Lemma C.1, (M c, sV ) |= Ki(p ∨ ¬p).
Thus, (M c, sV ′) |= p∨¬p for all sV ′ ∈ Kci (sV ). Therefore, p ∈ Ψ3. Thus, Ψ4 ⊆ Ψ1∩Ψ3. For the opposite
containment, if p ∈ Ψ1 ∩Ψ3, then (M c, sV ) |= Ki(p ∨ ¬p). By definition of projection, since p ∈ Ψ1 and
sW = ρ
c
Ψ2,Ψ1
(sV ), (M
c, sW ) |= Ki(p ∨ ¬p). Thus, p ∈ Ψ4. It follows that Ψ4 = Ψ1 ∩Ψ3.
To show that ρcΨ3,Ψ4(K
c
i (sV )) = K
c
i (sW ), we first prove that ρcΨ3,Ψ4(K
c
i (sV )) ⊇ K
c
i (sW ). Suppose
that sW ′ ∈ Kci (sW ). We construct V ′ such that ρcΨ3,Ψ4(sV ′) = sW ′ and sV ′ ∈ K
c
i (sV ). We claim that
V/Ki ∪ {ϕ = 1 : ϕ = 1 ∈ W
′, ϕ is implication-free} is AXK,→֒n -consistent. For suppose not. Then there
exist formulas ϕ1, ..., ϕm, ϕ′1, ..., ϕ′k such that ϕj = 1 ∈ V/Ki for j ∈ {1, ...,m}, ϕ′j is implication-free
and ϕ′j = 1 ∈ W ′ for j ∈ {1, ..., k}, and {ϕ1 = 1, ..., ϕm = 1, ϕ′1 = 1, ..., ϕ′k = 1} is not AXK,→֒n -
consistent. Let ψ = ϕ′1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕ′k. Then ψ = 1 ∈ W ′, so ψ = 1/2 6∈ W . Thus, by axiom B1 and Lemma
B.4(3), (Ki¬ψ) = 1/2 6∈ W . By definition of Kci , (Ki¬ψ) = 1 6∈ W , for otherwise ¬ψ = 1 ∈ W ′.
By axiom P11, it follows that (Ki¬ψ) = 0 ∈ W . Thus, by Lemma B.4(7), (¬Ki¬ψ) = 1 ∈ W , so
(¬Ki¬ψ) = 1 ∈ V . Thus, there must be some maximal AXK,→֒n -consistent set V ′′ ⊇ V/Ki such that
(¬ψ) = 1 /∈ V ′′. Since sV ′′ ∈ Kci (sV ) ⊆ ScΨ3 , Ψ4 ⊆ Ψ3, sW ′ ∈ SΨ4 , and (¬ψ) = 1/2 /∈ W
′
, we have
(¬ψ) = 1/2 /∈ V ′′. So, by axiom P11, (¬ψ) = 0 ∈ V ′′. Thus, ψ = 1 ∈ V ′′ and ϕ′1 = 1, ..., ϕ′k = 1 ∈ V ′′,
which is a contradiction since V ′′ ⊇ V/Ki and V ′′ is AXK,→֒n -consistent. Let V ′ be an AXK,→֒n -consistent
set containing V/Ki ∪ {ϕ = 1 : ϕ = 1 ∈ W ′, ϕ is implication-free}. By construction, sV ′ ∈ Kci (sV ).
Moreover, since (¬ϕ) = 1 ⇀↽ ϕ = 0 is valid in Hn and sW ′ ∈ ScΨ4 , ρ
c
Ψ3,Ψ4
(sV ′) agrees with sW ′ on all
formulas of the form ϕ = k for k ∈ {0, 1/2, 1} and ϕ implication-free. Therefore, it is easy to show using
Prop′ that they agree on all simple formulas. Thus, by the proof of Lemma C.4, they agree on all formulas
in LK,→֒n (Ψ4). By uniqueness of ρc, it follows that ρcΨ3,Ψ4(sV ′) = sW ′, as desired.
The proof of the other direction ρcΨ3,Ψ4(K
c
i (sV )) ⊆ K
c
i (sW ) is similar. Suppose that sV ′ ∈ Kci (sV )
and sV ′′ = ρcΨ3,Ψ4(sV ′). We need to prove that sV ′′ ∈ K
c
i (SW ). We claim that W/Ki ∪ {ϕ = 1 :
ϕ = 1 ∈ V ′′, ϕ is implication-free} is AXK,→֒n -consistent. For suppose not. Then there exist formulas
ϕ1, ..., ϕm, ϕ
′
1, ..., ϕ
′
k such that ϕj = 1 ∈ W/Ki for j ∈ {1, ...,m}, ϕ′j is implication-free and ϕ′j = 1 ∈
V ′′ for j ∈ {1, ..., k}, and {ϕ1 = 1, ..., ϕm = 1, ϕ′1 = 1, ..., ϕ′k = 1} is not AXK,→֒n -consistent. Let
ψ = ϕ′1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕ
′
k . Then ψ = 1 ∈ V ′′, so ψ = 1/2 6∈ V . Thus, by axiom B1 and Lemma B.4(3),
(Ki¬ψ) = 1/2 6∈ V . Using Lemmas C.1 and C.2, it is easy to show that ψ = 1 ∈ V ′′ implies ψ =
1 ∈ V ′, so, by definition of Kci , (Ki¬ψ) = 1 6∈ V , for otherwise ¬ψ = 1 ∈ V ′. By axiom P11, it
follows that (Ki¬ψ) = 0 ∈ V . Thus, by Lemma B.4(7), (¬Ki¬ψ) = 1 ∈ V . But as sV ′′ ∈ ScΨ4 ,
ψ = 1 ∈ V ′′ implies Φψ ∈ ScΨ4 . Since Ψ4 ⊆ Ψ1, it follows that ψ = 1/2 /∈ W , thus, by definition
of projection, we have (¬Ki¬ψ) = 1 ∈ W . Thus, there must be some maximal AXK,→֒n -consistent set
W ′ ⊇ W/Ki such that (¬ψ) = 1 /∈ W ′. Since sW ′ ∈ Kci (sW ) ⊆ ScΨ4 , we have (¬ψ) = 1/2 /∈ W
′
.
So by P11 it follows that (¬ψ) = 0 ∈ W ′, so ψ = 1 ∈ W ′. Thus, ϕ′1 = 1, ..., ϕ′k = 1 ∈ W ′, which
is a contradiction since W ′ ⊇ W/Ki and W ′ is AXK,→֒n -consistent. Let W ′ be an AXK,→֒n -consistent set
containing W/Ki ∪ {ϕ = 1 : ϕ = 1 ∈ V ′′, ϕ is implication-free}. By construction, sW ′ ∈ Kci (sW ).
Moreover, since (¬ϕ) = 1 ⇀↽ ϕ = 0 is valid in Hn and sW ′ , sV ′′ ∈ ScΨ4 , sV ′′ agrees with sW ′ on all
formulas of the form ϕ = k for k ∈ {0, 1/2, 1} and ϕ implication-free. Therefore, it is easy to show using
Prop′ that they agree on all simple formulas. Thus, by the proof of Lemma C.4, they agree on all formulas
in LK,→֒n (Ψ4). By uniqueness of ρc, it follows that sV ′′ = sW ′ ∈ Kci (sW ), as desired.
The following result is immediate from Proposition C.7.
Corollary C.8: Projection preserves knowledge and ignorance in M c.
Since projections preserve knowledge and ignorance in M c, it follows that M c ∈ Hn(Φ). This finishes
the proof for the case C = ∅. If T ′ ∈ C, we must show that M c satisfies generalized reflexivity. Given
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sV ∈ S
c
Ψ1
, by confinedness, Kci (sV ) ⊆ ScΨ2 for some Ψ2 ⊆ Ψ1. It clearly suffices to show that sW =
ρcΨ1,Ψ2(sV ) ∈ K
c
i (sV ). By Lemma C.6, to prove this, it suffices to show that V/Ki ∩ LK,→֒n (Ψ2) ⊆ W .
If ϕ = 1 ∈ V/Ki ∩ LK,→֒n (Ψ2), then Kiϕ = 1 ∈ V . Note that Prop′ implies that AXK,→֒n ⊢ ϕ →֒ ϕ = 1,
which by Gen, K′, Prop′, and MP′ implies that AXK,→֒n ⊢ (Kiϕ →֒ Ki(ϕ = 1)) = 1. Therefore, as
(Kiϕ) = 1 ∈ V , by Lemma B.4(8,10), (Ki(ϕ = 1)) = 1 ∈ V . By Prop′ and Lemma B.4(3), it follows that
Ki(ϕ = 1) ∈ V . By T′ and Lemma B.4(3), it follows that ϕ = 1 ∨
∨
{p:p∈Φϕ}Ki(p = 1/2) ∈ V . But since
ϕ ∈ LK,→֒n (Ψ2), we must have Φϕ ⊆ Ψ2. Moreover, since Kci (sV ) ⊆ ScΨ2 , we must have ¬Ki(p = 1/2) ∈
V for all p ∈ Ψ2. Thus, it easily follows that ϕ = 1 ∈ V . Finally, since sW = ρcΨ1,Ψ2(sV ), we must have
ϕ = 1 ∈W , as desired.
Now suppose 4′ ∈ C. We want to show that M c satisfies part (a) of stationarity. Suppose that sW ∈
Kci (sV ) and sX ∈ Kci (SW ). We must show that sX ∈ Kci (SV ). If (Kiϕ) = 1 ∈ V then, by axioms Prop′
and 4′ and Lemma B.4(3), (KiKiϕ) = 1 ∈ V . This implies that (Kiϕ) = 1 ∈ W , which implies that
ϕ = 1 ∈ X. Thus, V/Ki ⊆ X and sX ∈ Kci (sV ), as desired.
Finally, suppose that 5′ ∈ C. We want to show that M c satisfies part (b) of stationarity. Suppose that
sW ∈ K
c
i (sV ) and sX ∈ Kci (sV ). We must show that sX ∈ Kci (sW ). Suppose by way of contradiction
that sX /∈ Kci (sW ), then there exists ϕ = 1 ∈ W/Ki such that ϕ = 1 /∈ X. ϕ = 1 ∈ W/Ki implies
that (Kiϕ) = 1 ∈ W , so by Prop′, B1, and Lemma B.4(3) it follows that ϕ = 1/2 /∈ W . By Conf2 it
can be easily shown that ϕ = 1/2 /∈ X, so by Prop′, we get that ϕ = 0 ∈ X. As in the proof of the case
T ′ ∈ C, if (Kiϕ) = 1 ∈ W , then (Ki(ϕ = 1)) = 1 ∈ W . Then it follows that (Ki¬Ki(ϕ = 1)) = 1 /∈ V ,
for otherwise since sW ∈ Kci (sV ) we get that (¬Ki(ϕ = 1)) = 1 ∈ W . Since (Ki¬Ki(ϕ = 1)) ∈ D2,
it is easy to show that (¬Ki¬Ki(ϕ = 1)) = 1 ∈ V . By Prop′ and 5′ and Lemma B.4(8,10), it follows
that (Ki(ϕ = 1) ∨ Ki((ϕ = 1) = 1/2)) = 1 ∈ V . Then using Lemma B.4(5,6,7), it easily follows that
either (Ki(ϕ = 1)) = 1 ∈ V or (Ki((ϕ = 1) = 1/2)) = 1 ∈ V . Then, either (ϕ = 1) = 1 ∈ X or
((ϕ = 1) = 1/2) = 1 ∈ X, but this is a contradiction since ϕ = 0 ∈ X and X is AXK,→֒n -consistent.
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